Mechanism of the better-than-average effect in moral issues: Asymmetrical causal attribution across moral (vs. immoral) contexts

Abstract

Previous research has found that the better-than-average effect exists in moral issues: specifically, people believe that they are more moral than others. The present study demonstrated the better-than-average effect in judging moral and immoral behaviors in oneself. In Study 1 (N = 233), we found that the better-than-average effect is observed in estimating the intention of immoral behaviors in oneself, which means that people are likely to perceive themselves having less intention to conduct immoral behaviors than others. In Study 2 (N = 52), we confirmed the better-than-average effect in the estimation of their intention both on moral and immoral issues. In Study 3 (N = 153), we manipulated actors (self vs. others) and the level of morality (very immoral, immoral, moral, or very moral) and investigated the interaction between the actors and the level of morality on two types of causal attribution (i.e., dispositional or situational attribution). We found that when participants were asked to imagine having engaged in immoral behaviors, they made less dispositional attributions. In contrast, when participants were asked to imagine having in moral behaviors, they made less situational attributions. Our results showed that a systematic asymmetry of causal attribution resulted in the better-than-average effect, which varied with levels of morality.