Abstract

The conflict has taken place all over the world. This research investigates the factors. In addition, this research clarifies the turning point of institutional change by considering the mechanism of civil war through theory, its simulation, and case/empirical analysis. Also, when the support base of challengers during the civil war changes according to the ideology of the residents, the system reflects the ideology of the residents in terms of political economy. Although it is difficult to defeat the government by one power, if two or more political groups collaborate, we mainly consider the case where they have power over the government and consider what mechanism they should collaborate with two or more groups. what predictions themselves power after defeat the conflict after the alliance. When some political power decides whether they challenges the government, even if the power is weaker than the government, in the long run, it is expected that the challenger will defeat the civil war by the support of the residents of local and the third power. This paper provides that challenge to the ruler is the long-term optimal strategy for the challenger. Also, political instability has occurred in many countries, even if no the conflict takes place. One of the reasons for the political instability is the decentralization of power, but we will theoretically consider how decentralization of power occurs. This is due to the reduced ability of sanctions of the ruler against challengers and the lack of administration capability as economic side for the ruler. Our model introduces variables with political ideology and the administration capacity in economic side. we regards political ideology, there are regions with different utility functions by different ideology, because we think that people’s ideology are divided into the result equality egalitarian (socialist) ideology in rural area and opportunity equality egalitarian (capitalist) ideology in urban area. The important role of the government is to protect the property values of residents and to secure property rights and to provide public goods services. When the ruler fails to play an important role in the government, it will lose the support base of ruler and affect the outcome of the civil war. Consider a model in which the utility function of the residents includes the utility obtained from private goods and public goods, and the price level affects the value of private goods and public goods of people. It is assumed that the price level will be affected by weapons imports of the ruler and domestic debt balance influence in the conflict. Also, to secure supply, the support and military power of the domestic people and local powerful people are important factors for winning the civil war. We divide the elements of military power into military technology and domestic support and introduce the model that the rise of military technology leads to decentralization and domestic support to the challenger. When the government is judged that: (1) they have military technology but do not have domestic support, (2) few people support the political ideology of the ruling party, and (3) they cannot administer the government from the perspective of economic stability by people. It indicates that the relative position of the government will be weakened, decentralization will occur, or the ruler will change through the civil war. The decentralization of this study means that the challenger will continue to have a strong influence in the country after the civil war because the government cannot execute decisive sanctions despite the defeat of the challenger.

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