Measuring the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny of Bills: Some Evidence from Ireland

Abstract

This paper presents some preliminary results of a tabulation and analysis of amendments proposed to Bills debated by the two Houses (Dail Eireann (the House of Representatives) and Seanad Eireann (the Senate) of the Irish Parliament, the Oireachtas, in the periods 1969-1973 and 1982-1989. 8,874 amendments were considered for the purposes of the study. The preliminary results are tabulations of the amendments according to the nature of the proposer (whether it was proposed by the government, by a government backbenchers, by an opposition party frontbencher, by an opposition party backbencher or by an independent) and the disposition of the amendment (whether it was agreed, negatived, withdrawn, not moved, out of order, formally moved and agreed and whether by a division of the House.) The approach of the study is broadly that taken by Professor J.A.G. Griffiths in THE PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF GOVERNMENT BILLS (1974). A simple tabulation of how amendments proposed by each category of amendments was disposed of in the periods which were studied tends to confirm the general perception that in a system such as the Irish one in which the government exercises a high level of control over decisions made both in plenary session of each House and in committees, amendments proposed by the government are hardly ever unsuccessful, whereas amendments proposed from other quarters are hardly ever accepted. The highest success rate for non-governments amendments in either the Dail or the Seanad in any sub-division of the periods under study was 6.65% (in the Seventeenth Seanad which sat from 1983 to 1987.) However, when if one analyses the disposition of amendments more deeply, one discovers a higher level of response to arguments made by the opposition parties, by government backbenchers and by independents. In that regard, an amendment can be reckoned a success if, for example, it is withdrawn in return for an undertaking by a minister - which is subsequently carried out at a later stage - to introduce a government amendment, drafted by parliamentary counsel, which will have the same effect. Similarly, since many amendments are intended merely to probe what the meaning or the impact of the legislation will be, a satisfactory explanation or clarification by the Minister, which leads the amendment to be withdrawn can also be accounted a successful outcome. When this type of analysis is undertaken, it emerges that the rate of positive response to non-government is often of the order of 30% or more. It is also clear that this adjusted rate of response varies quite considerably between different time periods and from Bill to Bill, in a manner which is masked by the raw data in relation to how often non-government amendments are accepted. The author will in future publications present further hypotheses and evidence in relation to what variables are most significant in this respect and will further investigate how one may assess the importance of the changes made to Bills by or in response to non-government amendments.