Measuring the Existence Value of Wildlife: Reply

Abstract

We know little about the motives underlying individual responses to contingent valuation (CV) questions concerning the existence of wildlife. Yet, motives are important because they determine how the resulting value estimates should be interpreted and used in making management decisions. For example, zero bids are very common in CV, but these are often protests that do not represent zero valuation for the resource itself. Protest zero bids may be particularly prevalent in wildlife existence value studies because some people may view trade-offs between money and wildlife as unethical or immoral. If protest zero bids are not interpreted correctly, existence value estimates obviously will be biased. The motives underlying positive CV bids also matter. Unfortunately, these motives have received much less research attention and so may be more controversial. Our study of wildlife values in New England suggests that many respondents who gave positive bids were motivated by ethical concerns, altruism, or the desire to do their fair share-concerns that indicate they used decision-making processes inconsistent with the neoclassical paradigm (Stevens et al. 1991). CV results may therefore fail to measure the economic value of existence in traditional terms. The Bergson-Tintner-Samuelson formulation presented by Kohn (1993) is useful in this context because it attempts to disentangle behavior motivated by ethical concerns about existence from preferences about wildlife use. Each individual is assumed to wear two hats: one as citizen, the other as consumer. From this perspective citizens express social values, which may be ethically driven, while economic values are expressed by consumers. Kohn suggests that we make use of this distinction by first asking respondents, as citizens, to make implicit trade-offs between income and the preservation of wildlife. Respondents are then asked about their willingness to pay for the option of consuming wildlife. While this is an interesting proposal, the Bergson-Tintner-Samuelson framework is only one of several alternative theories about behavior involving ethical considerations. For discussion, these theories can be classified into three groups: (a) theories of social or group interest, (b) natural rights, and (c) theories based upon the neoclassical model of self interest. Social interest theories include the Bergson-Tintner-Samuelson formulation outlined by Kohn and the dual utilities model proposed by Margolis (1982). Margolis suggests that people are motivated by two basic concerns; (a) self-interest and (b) social or group interest. Social interest, which pertains to the welfare of society as a whole, is assumed to be governed in part by ethics, moral duty, and commitment. Expressions of social interest include charity, participation in the political process (voting), and contributions for the provision of public goods. Margolis maintains that the neoclassical theory of self-interest generally fails to adequately explain individual behavior about social interests, and he proposes a dual utilities model of individual preferences in which people have irreducibly distinct social and private preferences. Unlike the framework proposed by Kohn, there is no grand maximum where social value is traded off against private value. Rather individuals are assumed to allocate income between social and private preferences so as to do their fair share for the welfare of society as a whole. Con-