Abstract
To capture genuine utilitarian tendencies, (Kahane et al., Psychological Review 125:131, 2018) developed the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) based on two subscales, which measure the commitment to impartial beneficence and the willingness to cause harm for the greater good. In this article, I argue that the impartial beneficence subscale, which breaks ground with previous research on utilitarian moral psychology, does not distinctively measure utilitarian moral judgment. I argue that Kantian ethics captures the all-encompassing impartial concern for the well-being of all human beings. The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale draws, in fact, a point of division that places Kantian and utilitarian theories on the same track. I suggest that the impartial beneficence subscale needs to be significantly revised in order to capture distinctively utilitarian judgments. Additionally, I propose that psychological research should focus on exploring multiple sources of the phenomenon of impartial beneficence without categorizing it as exclusively utilitarian.
Highlights
Utilitarianism has always had a bad reputation
How can a moral theory that advocates a feeling of unity with all our fellow creatures be a “doctrine” for psychopaths? Psychological research has focused too much on the sacrificial dilemmas paradigm which essentially asks the negative question of how willing we are to kill others
When we propose a solution to a practical issue, we compare it with our immediate ethical beliefs
Summary
Before I continue, I want to address some data in Kahane et al (2018) which appears to be at odds with a Kantian endorsement of impartial beneficence To further validate their psychological construct, Kahane et al compared OUS scores with the self-reported moral views of experts. They expected utilitarian philosophers to have excellent scores on a utilitarian scale, while Kantians not to have so good scores. We should not add up the ratings for each item in an overall score In this way, we could see which items (rejection of act/omission distinction – 4; degree of self-sacrifice – 1, 2, 5; impartial concern for all human beings – 3) are endorsed or rejected in Kantian terms
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