Abstract
It is now well documented that individuals tend to change their behavior when their actions are observed by others. Yet there is no systematic way of measuring this dimension of preferences at the individual level. In this paper, we propose and validate a novel experimental game to measure individual sensitivity to social image. We document substantial heterogeneity in the level of image concern. We show that image concerned individuals tend to be less cooperative in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, especially when their actions cannot be observed by others. Finally, we present evidence suggesting that the level of image concern is uncorrelated with observer characteristics, with one exception: members of ethnic minorities appear less sensitive to being observed by another member of a minority group.
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