Measures Against the Spread of COVID-19: Simultaneous International Action and Lockdown Postponement

Abstract

This study discusses city lockdowns in response to the outbreak of COVID-19. Using a two-stage repetitive game, policymakers choose from three options: no lockdown, independent lockdown, and lockdown with other countries simultaneously. This study concludes that simultaneous lockdowns are optimal when there is a high number of travelers from abroad and that either independent or simultaneous lockdowns are preferable when there is a high number of people traveling internally from rural to urban areas. When the number of infected people is low, the government should respond by requesting self-restraint. Of course, policymakers must respond differently depending on their domestic environment. Generally, however, policymakers have the incentive to postpone lockdown measures. If there is significant inward travel from abroad, leaders may hesitate to implement a lockdown because there is a chance that infection is already spreading due to the fact that infected people from other countries have already flown in; this means that lockdown measures of that kind, even if done in a hurry, would not accomplish very much. If there is significant migration from rural to urban areas, leaders may hesitate to implement a lockdown because these kinds of measures in urban areas hinder local employment and destroy domestic supply chains. Ultimately, though, policymakers generally decide to implement a lockdown. While there is significant hesitance, as urban lockdowns seriously harm rural areas and can cause economic turmoil greater than that of the Lehman Shock, it is preferable in the long term to suffer the temporary decline in consumption in order to suppress the spread of the virus. There have been many impact studies focused on this lockdown. These results are consistent with the findings of these previous studies, which suggested that lockdowns in urban areas should be incorporated into discussions on the impact on rural areas. If policymakers are optimistic about the outbreak coming to an end, lockdown can be postponed. The WHO pandemic declaration has changed its perception that the spread of infection will end soon, based on policymakers' optimistic perceptions. Policymakers make daily decisions about whether to implement lockdowns. If the effect of a request for self-restraint is small—if the rate of infection continues to rise—the game structure changes from a long-term finite repetition game to an infinite repetition game. As a result, policymakers worldwide have adopted lockdown measures.