Measurement is the core disgust problem: Response to Inbar and Scott (2018)

Abstract

AbstractScott, Inbar and Rozin (2016) presented evidence that trait disgust predicts opposition to genetically modified food (GMF). Royzman, Cusimano, and Leeman (2017) argued that these authors did not appropriately measure trait disgust (disgust quaoral inhibitionorOI) and that, once appropriately measured, the hypothesized association between disgust and GMF attitudes was not present. In their commentary, Inbar and Scott (2018) challenge our conclusions in several ways. In this response, we defend our conclusions by showing (a) that OI is psychometrically distinct from other affective categories, (b) that OI is widely held to be the criterial feature of disgust and (c) that we were well-justified to pair OI with the pathogen-linked vignettes that we used. Furthermore, we extend our critique to the new findings presented by Inbar and Scott (2018); we show that worry and suspicion (not disgust) are the dominant affective states one is likely to experience while thinking about GMF and that the true prevalence of disgust is about zero. We conclude by underscoring that the present argument and findings are a part of a larger body of evidence challenging any causal effect of disgust on morality.