Measurement-device-independenization of quantum key distribution protocols

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows the legitimate partner to establish a secret key whose security only depends on physical laws. In recent years, research on QKD by employing insecure measurement devices, namely measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) is increased. MDI-QKD removes all attacks on measurement devices and thus an untrusted third party can be employed for measuring. However, a weakness of previous MDI-QKD protocols is the need for joint measurements such as Bell measurements whose efficiency is low in practice. On the other hand, can all QKD protocols become measurement-device-independent remains a problem. In this paper, we present a scheme making prepare-measure QKD protocols become MDI-QKD protocols, called ′measurement−device−independenization′, which does not need to employ joint measurements and could be efficiently implemented by weak coherence sources. The protocol might look like the detector-device-independent (DDI) protocols but it is also secure under the Trojan horse attack. To illustrate this, we investigate the photon-number-adding (PNA) attack and present a scheme, called ′photon−number−purification′, which can also be employed to close loopholes for previous protocols such as DDI and plug-and-play ones.