Meaning Change, Multiple Routes, and the Role of Differentiation in Conceptual Change: Alternatives to Resubsumption?

Abstract

The three commentaries on the resubsumption theory highlight three key ideas: that the term conceptual change, as commonly used, is ambiguous between “change in the meaning of a concept” and “change in what someone believes”; that there are multiple routes to successful learning of conceptual subject matters; and that the noticing of a previously unheeded contrast can be as strong a driver of change as the noticing of an unheeded similarity. These ideas are consistent with the resubsumption theory. Other arguments and objections to resubsumption are shown to be irrelevant or weak. Although the commentaries contribute important ideas, the latter do not add up to a superior theory of how and why resistance to conflicting information is overcome and core beliefs revised. The commentaries also illustrate three knotty points in conceptual change research that stand in need of attention.