Abstract
This paper studies social optima in the model of dynamic production competition by the mean field methodology. The objective of all agents (firms) is to optimize a social cost. We first introduce a market of a large number of firms with sticky prices and adjustment costs. The cost of each agent has indefinite state weights. By solving an auxiliary limiting optimal control problem subject to consistent mean field approximations, a set of decentralized strategies is obtained and further shown to be asymptotically optimal. The performance estimate will exploit a passivity property of the underlying model.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
