McCabe and Davies on God as not being a moral agent

Abstract

ABSTRACT A large part of the contemporary philosophy of religion concerns the so-called ‘problem of evil’. It is difficult to see how pain and wickedness, and all the calamities that afflict our poor world, could even happen in a world created and ruled by God as he is described in classical theism. The problem of evil would likely make the very existence of the God of theism very unlikely, if not logically and existentially absurd. There are, however, some dissenting strands in this almost complete unanimity about the enormous philosophical and religious importance of the problem of evil. It could be found in Herbert McCabe’s and Brian Davies’s works. What McCabe and Davies say is linked to their diagnosis of a certain creeping anthropomorphism in the understanding of divine action, which has particularly spread in modern and contemporary philosophy of God. It results from a certain metaphysical presupposition about God, which McCabe and Davies do not share with most analytical philosophers, whether friends or foes of Christianity; and it seems to me that one would find some close presupposition among many continental philosophers, even if it is expressed in a very different way.