Mécanismes bayésiens incitatifs: Un survol informel de quelques résultats récents

Abstract

This paper presents a survey of some recent results on Bayesian mechanisms. We show that efficient Bayesian mechanisms can "nearly always" be constructed by adding a Groves mechanisms and a Bayesian mechanism whose only aim is to balance the budget. In so doing, we present an interpretation of a condition-called condition C-which plays an important role in the literature. The last part of the paper is focussed on the implementation of non efficient decision rules, and contains a discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions so that this be possible. * C. d'ASPREMONT: CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain; J. CREMER: Virginia Poly technic Institute and State University et GREMAQ, Universite de Toulouse l; L. A. GERARD-VARET: GREQE, Ecole des Hautes etudes en Sciences Sociales, Marseille. Nous remercions Pierre PICARD pour ses commentaires.