Mayors, Using Cultural Expenditure in An Opportunistic Way Improves the Chances of Re-Election, but Do Not Do It: Revisiting Political Budget Cycles

Jordi Sanjuán,Raül Abeledo,Pau Rausell,Vicente Coll

doi:10.3390/su12219095

Abstract

This article analyzes whether expenditure on the provision of merit goods, culture, health, education, and sports, by local governments, in medium-sized cities (between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants) is tied to the electoral cycle; that is, whether expenditure increases in the run up to an electoral process. Further, we analyze whether the increase in spending on Culture by local governments has any significant effect on the probability of local governments being re-elected. To answer these questions, a database of 350 medium-sized municipalities is used comprising the period 2011 to 2019, when two municipal elections were held in Spain; in 2015 and in 2019. The results confirm that both total spending and spending on culture and sports, are tied to the electoral cycle, while expenditure on other merit goods is not. Moreover, using a logit model, it is confirmed that an increase in culture expenditure has a significant effect on the probability of the government being re-elected. Specifically, a one-third increase in cultural expenditure, as a proportion of total expenditure (e.g., passing from 6% to 8%) at local government level, improves re-election chances by almost 10%.

Highlights

How does the electoral cycle affect cultural policies? What effect do elections have on local budgets for culture? Does public spending on culture have any impact on the re-election chances of city mayors? This paper seeks to identify whether there is a political cycle in local spending, i.e., whether in the year before a local election is held, governing politicians systematically increase budgets as a mechanism to increase their chances of winning elections
As cultural economists, we are interested in whether this political cycle occurs in the area of cultural expenditure, as opposed to expenditure on other merit goods such as health, education, or sports
In order to observe this phenomenon in more precise terms, we have focused on medium-sized cities, trying to avoid the distortions of the “person effect” in small municipalities and the influence of large cycles of political change in larger cities where municipal elections can be influenced by the contagion effects of regional, national, and international trends and, be less determined by local dynamics

Summary

Introduction

How does the electoral cycle affect cultural policies? What effect do elections have on local budgets for culture? Does public spending on culture have any impact on the re-election chances of city mayors? This paper seeks to identify whether there is a political cycle in local spending, i.e., whether in the year before a local election is held, governing politicians systematically increase budgets as a mechanism to increase their chances of winning elections. In order to observe this phenomenon in more precise terms, we have focused on medium-sized cities, trying to avoid the distortions of the “person effect” in small municipalities and the influence of large cycles of political change in larger cities where municipal elections can be influenced by the contagion effects of regional, national, and international trends and, be less determined by local dynamics. Local elections emphasize the individual candidate’s link to voters, with the proximity effect becoming predominant. This increases the relevance of the individual among the voting factors and decreases the weight of other motivations [1]. Global political trends condition the orientation of voters who, even given the scale of the city, hardly notice marginal changes to local public spending decisions, which can be confused with regional or national government spending

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