Mayoral elections and partisan dynamics in Africa’s local governments

Abstract

ABSTRACT Enforcing party loyalty is particularly difficult in settings where parties are not strongly differentiated by policy or ideological platforms, as is the case in many African countries. Instead, the system of party nominations serves an important role in maintaining loyalty and discipline. Yet, direct mayoral elections at the subnational level affect these dynamics by expanding the range of positions that politicians can occupy, thereby creating opportunities for them to forge greater visibility within their party or enabling them to defect and create an independent political identity. Drawing on the case of Zambia, which shifted in 2016 from indirect to direct mayoral elections for its district councils, this article discusses how the change in electoral rules contributed to more independent mayoral candidates and growing intra-party frictions, especially among mayors governing large urban areas. Additional case studies from Senegal, which shifted to direct elections in 2022, and Mozambique, which reverted to indirect elections in 2018, further underscore the external validity of the analysis while refining its scope conditions. The article emphasizes that while political decentralization is often viewed as a mechanism for enhancing downwards accountability to citizens, it can also exert considerable impacts on party loyalty.