Abstract
In 1989, I. Gilboa and D. Schmeidler proposed an extension of subjective expected utility theory called maxmin expected utility. The author presents a new exposition of this theory and suggests an extension of maxmin expected utility that which does not allow strictly dominated alternatives to be chosen. Maxmin expected utility is related to the earlier notion of weight of evidence and an application to welfare economics is discussed. The author examines normative properties of maxmin expected utility and argues that the theory is not vulnerable to the Dutch book argument. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
