Abstract
Inspired by the model of Kalai and Satterthwaite (1994, in Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organisations (R. P. Gilles and P. H. M. Ruys, Eds.), Chap. 2, Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic), I define a class of abstract games, called maximum games, which are dominance-solvable. In the leading subclass of games of common interest, they are solvable on the unique Pareto-dominant outcome. Maximum games include, as economic applications, some types of Bertrand games and public good games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
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