Maximizing presidential coattails: the impact of the electoral calendar on the composition of the National Assembly

Abstract

Since 2000, the French presidential term has been shortened so that it is now the same as that of the National Assembly. What is more, legislative elections have been scheduled to follow immediately after the election of the president. This article assesses the magnitude of the presidential coattail effects on legislative elections. We show that the identity of the winner at the presidential election affects electoral outcomes in subsequent elections in favor of the presidents’ parties. This may happen through two channels. First, voters who have voted for losing candidates may abstain in the following election. Second, some voters—particularly those who do not strongly oppose the president—may join the winning side. Based on district-level electoral data from 2002 to 2017, we appraise the impact of presidential election results on turnout and voter choice in legislative elections. Our results highlight that winning the presidential election produces a 25% increase in the votes for the winning presidential parties in legislative elections. Furthermore, while the decline in turnout may partly explain this result, we provide some clues that swing voters contribute considerably to the increase for presidential parties. More generally, this article shows that the new electoral calendar weakens the parliament and considerably increases the power of French presidents.