Abstract
A counterexample is given to Lemma 1 of Ray and Vohra (2019). This lemma is a key part of the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 1) of the cited paper. We give an additional condition under which Lemma 1 holds. This condition specifies that when a coalition of players T is broken up by the participation of some of its players in an coalitional move by S , then the new coalitions and payoffs for the remainder of the players T S depend on neither the coalitions and payoffs of players outside of T before the breakup, nor the coalitions and payoffs of players outside of T S after the breakup, nor the identities of players in S who are not members of T.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.