Abstract
We consider the problem of the fair allocation of indivisible goods and money with non-quasi-linear preferences. The purpose of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy-free solutions. We show that under a certain domain-richness condition, each individual obtains the welfare level of his “optimal” envy-free allocation by maximally manipulating the solutions. This maximal manipulation theorem is helpful in analyzing the set of Nash equilibrium allocations in the direct revelation games associated with a given envy-free solution: if an envy-free solution satisfies a mild condition, the set of Nash equilibrium allocations in its associated direct revelation game coincides with that of envy-free allocations.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
