Abstract
In the context of the provision of one pure public good, we study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition. This question is qualified by the additional requirement that a domain should include “a minimally rich domain.” We first characterize generalized median voter schemes as the unique class of strategy-proof rules on minimally rich domains. Then we establish that the unique maximal domain, including a minimally rich one which allows for the existence of strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition, is the domain of convex preferences. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D71.
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