Abstract
The substantive underpinnings of Max Weber's `Sociology of Law' and the standing of judges therein are discussed. Foregrounding his conception of the administration of justice, perennial concern with the correlation between personality and the structure of domination, and account of legal rationalization, his discernment of the vital adjudicative role assumed by judges and the bearing of their personal qualifications is elucidated. The focus is placed on Weber's putatively negative assessment of the Common Law. Reading his appraisal of precedent and the charismatic stature of the judge in light of his theory of casuistry and critique of bureaucracy, it is shown that his examination implicitly extols the English administration of justice.
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