Abstract
This article shows how Weber uses the postulates of what is known as 'conceptual jurisprudence' (Begriffsjurisprudenz) to build the structure of ideal-typical concepts presented at the conclusion of Part 1 of his Sociology of Law. Conceptual jurisprudence also furnishes Weber with the stock of concepts he draws on for the categories he employs to denote those technical elements of legal practice and those thought processes which serve to foster the rationalization of (private) law. By elevating the 'ideal' of conceptual jurisprudence to a methodology, while, in his critical assessment of the School of Free Law (Sociology of Law, Part 8), simultaneously idealizing this ideal, Weber falls victim to that very 'confusion' of ideal-typical concept formation and value judgment that he himself had so emphatically warned against (in his Objectivity essay).
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