Mavericks or Loyalists? Popular Ballot Jumpers and Party Discipline in the Flexible-List PR Context

Abstract

Preference voting threatens the power of party leaders in PR contexts to enforce party unity and pursue policy by encouraging candidates to groom personal reputations. This study posits that party leadership might be able to enforce party discipline through other means at their disposal even as their control over candidates’ election ranks weakens. These include access to the party label and distribution of senior legislative- and party positions. Using original data from the Czech flexible-list PR context covering the period between 1996 and 2021, this study shows that the MPs who are elected thanks to preference voting are no more likely than their colleagues to individualize their legislative behavior or cast a dissenting roll-call vote. What is more, these popular MPs face a more restricted access to reelection and senior positions that come with agenda-setting power and exposure. This evidence suggests that political parties take active steps to limit the autonomy of the MPs who owe their positions to voters.