Abstract
Forswearing venerable doctrine, some now claim that the truth-value of a statement A, and — more generally — that of a theory T, hinges upon (the truth-values of) all other statements from the same language as A or T. I should like to investigate this matter as regards languages of four main sorts: first-order languages without a box (called here L1), first-order languages with a box (called L□), predicative second-order languages (called L2!), and impredicative second-order languages (called L 2).
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