Matter of Fact, Matter of Law, and the Attainder of the Earl of Strafford

Abstract

The impeachment, trial, and attainder of the Earl of Strafford is perhaps the most famous example of parliamentary judicature in English history. His fate generated enormous controversy among his contemporaries1 and, despite Charles II's attempt to obliterate the official record of the proceedings,2 historians have continued the debate to the present day. Most of the attention has been focused on the doctrines of law and political theory under which Strafford was condemned. Responding to C. V. Wedgwood's charge that the opposition used a manufactured theory of treason to slaughter by attainder a man they could not otherwise convict,3 Conrad Russell has produced an extremely influential article which argues that Strafford was condemned on the basis of generally accepted doctrines of law and political theory.4 More recently J. H. Timmis III has suggested that much of the debate on Strafford's case has been