Abstract
This paper deals with the problem of managing the risks of complex systems under targeted attacks. It is usually solved by using Defender–Attacker models or similar ones. However, such models do not consider the influence of the defending system structure on the expected attack outcome. Our goal was to study how the structure of an abstract system affects its integral risk. To achieve this, we considered a situation where the Defender knows the structure of the expected attack and can arrange the elements to achieve a minimum of integral risk. In this paper, we consider a particular case of a simple chain attack structure. We generalized the concept of a local risk function to account for structural effects and found an ordering criterion that ensures the optimal placement of the defending system’s elements inside a given simple chain structure. The obtained result is the first step to formulate the principles of optimally placing system elements within an arbitrarily complex network. Knowledge of these principles, in turn, will allow solving the problems of optimal allocation of resources to minimize the risks of a complex system, considering its structure.
Highlights
One of the most topical problems in studying complex networks is developing mathematical models of various disruptive effects, including targeted attacks on the nodes or edges of a network
Defender–Attacker and Defender–Attacker–Defender models of countering the attacks in complex systems, or models of effective security monitoring and risk management of complex networks, which we have considered in prior studies [32,33]
This paper considers the problem of optimal placement of elements of the protected system within a given structure of the expected attack
Summary
One of the most topical problems in studying complex networks is developing mathematical models of various disruptive effects, including targeted attacks on the nodes or edges of a network. Such models assess the risks and the propagation of failures in complex systems of different natures. In terms of complex network risk management problems, these percolation models naturally belong to a broader class of Defender–Attacker–Defender (D-A-D) models [24,25] Such models consider the conflict between two actors.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
