Abstract
We analyze mathematical properties of apportionment functions in the context of allocating seats in the European Parliament. Some exemplary families of such functions are specified and the corresponding allocations of seats among the Member States of the European Union are presented. We show that the constitutional constraints for the apportionment are so strong that the admissible functions lead to rather similar solutions.
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