Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis

Abstract

Abstract In discussing the logical status of the thesis that sensations are processes in the brain, J. J. C. Smart (1959, pp. 155-156)1 contends that I was partly right and partly wrong in maintaining that this thesis could and should be interpreted as a straightforward scientific hypothesis (Place, 1956). He argues that insofar as the issue is between a brain-process thesis and a heart, liver, or kidney thesis the is­ sue is empirical and can be decided by experiment. But insofar as the issue is between materialism on the one hand and epiphenomenalism, psychophysical parallelism, interactionism, and so forth, on the other, the issue is nonempirical. I shall argue that Smart is partly right and partly wrong in maintaining that the is­ sue between the kind of materialism that both he and I would wish to defend and the rival doctrines of epiphenomenalism, psychophysical parallelism, interaction­ism, and so forth, is a nonempirical issue.