Abstract

In this paper we present a new metaphysical theory of material objects. On our theory, objects are bundles of property instances, where those properties give the nature or essence of that object. We call the theory essential bundle theory. Property possession is not analysed as bundle-membership, as in traditional bundle theories, since accidental properties are not included in the object’s bundle. We have a different story to tell about accidental property possession. This move reaps many benefits. Essential bundle theory delivers a simple theory of the essential properties of material objects; an explanation of how object coincidence can arise; an actual-world ground for modal differences between coincident objects; a simple story about intrinsic properties; and a plausible account of certain ubiquitous cases of causal overdetermination.

Highlights

  • How should a metaphysician characterise material objects? Are they mere masses of matter? Bundles of properties? Regions of spacetime? Substrata? Traditional attempts to answer these questions diverge on whether there is something to being a given object, aside from its properties

  • Essential bundle theory delivers a simple theory of the essential properties of material objects; an explanation of how object coincidence can arise; an actual-world ground for modal differences between coincident objects; a simple story about intrinsic properties; and a plausible account of certain ubiquitous cases of causal overdetermination

  • Most importantly, when we identify a material object with a bundle of property instances, we understand those properties as telling us about the nature or essence of the object in question

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Summary

Introduction

How should a metaphysician characterise material objects? Are they mere masses of matter? Bundles of properties? Regions of spacetime? Substrata? Traditional attempts to answer these questions diverge on whether there is something to being a given object, aside from its properties. Our aim in this paper it to introduce a new answer to the question, what are material objects?, which falls somewhere between these traditional answers It incorporates elements of both bundle and substance theories, together with new ideas which, we think, add up to a new approach. We allow for there to be distinct yet permanently coincident material objects, differing from one another in their natures This feature arises naturally from our account of when property instances form a material-object-constituting bundle (3) It should explain cases in which we appear to have distinct yet permanently coincident objects Each of these criteria has been the focus of a great deal of metaphysical discussion. (4) We’d like an account which explains how material objects possess properties, and stand in relations to one another. We think our approach provides us with a good explanation in each case

Bundles and substances
The nature thesis
The grounding problem
Property possession
The problem of relations
Objections considered
Conclusion
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