Abstract
This paper presents a procurement auction format structured so as to reconcile supply-side costs with demand-side value through the alignment of bidder and bid-taker interests. The existence of a dominant bidding strategy ensures this alignment and, at the same time, discourages strategic bidding. The format also involves minimal revelation of bidder information, making it attractive to bidders who expect continued participation in the same market. Another major goal of this paper is to engage policymakers through a discussion of important issues, which were brought forth in the course of designing and analyzing the aforementioned auction, that relate generally to the successful execution of procurement auctions.
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