Mass Terms, Generic Expressions, and Plato's Theory of Forms

Abstract

Mass Terms, Generic Expressions, and Plato's Theory of Forms ROBIN SMITH I. A FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE of Plato's Theory of Forms is to explain why things have certain properties; for instance, why some things are beautiful, why some people are just, why some objects are beds. We can (and Plato often does) state this purpose in the formal mode also: the Theory explains why certain predicates are true of certain things; for instance, why 'beautiful' is true of some things, 'just' of some people, 'bed' of some objects. The Theory produces explanations by supposing that at least for each of a certain group of predicates there exists a corresponding Form; that the predicate is true of the Form, and indeed supremely true of it; and that if the predicate is true of anything else besides the Form, it is because that thing is in a certain relationship with the Form (which Plato most often designates 'participation'). Stated in terms of properties rather than predicates, this would be: the Form has the property, and indeed supremely; and if anything else has the property, it is because that thing partakes of the Form.1 Plato sometimes says this as: each Form has a certain 'power' (dunamis) which it imparts to its participants (Prt. 330, Prin. 133e). As a sort of corollary, Forms serve to give the meanings of predicate terms; those terms get their meanings by referring in some way to the Forms to which they apply primarily. Forms also play several other roles in Plato's philosophical picture. From the last point, it follows that in order to know the meaning of a predicate (or in order to know what a property really is) one must have knowledge of a Form. Thus Forms are the center of Plato's epistemology. They occupy an analogous metaphysical position, since he regards them as real in a way that other things are not. In a number of places, they play a role as paradigms-paradigms that things in nature imitate and aspire to (Phd. 75, Prin. 132d), or paradigms that an artisan would make use of (Cra. 389, Rep. 597). Both of these conceptions appear in the Timaeus. We may also note that Forms play roles as objects of aesthetic and ethical admiration. In order to play these roles, Forms must have certain characteristics. First, they must be predicatively pre-eminent: a Form must be the pre-eminent bearer of its name, the paramount instance of its quality. This includes the claim that Forms must be, in the phrase introduced by Vlastos, 2 self-predicative. Next, whatever Forms are, they are to be distinguished from ordinary physical objects. Plato's view ' Condensed versions of this account of the Theory of Forms appear several times in the Parmenides: 130b2-5, 130e5-131a2, 132al-4. Gregory Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides," Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 319-349; reprinted, with "Addendum (1963)," in R. E. Allen, ed. Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (London, 1965), pp. 231-263. [141] 142 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY here undergoes development as he becomes more aware of his views and their consequences , but at least in the Phaedo and later works we find definite claims distinguishing the Forms from those things perceptible to the senses. We may conveniently refer to this characteristic of Forms as separation (the term is of course Aristotle's). Both a motive for and a consequence of the separation of the Forms is Plato's view that they are eternal and immutable. Finally, especially in later works, there is considerable emphasis on the unity and the intelligibility of Forms. A rather surprising thing about this Theory is the ease with which participants in the dialogues accept its claims. In the Euthyphro, for instance, when Socrates asks if "the impious isn't always contrary to all the pious, but similar to itself, with whatever is going to be impious having some one Form [mian tina idean] with respect to its impiety," Euthyphro, who is presumably a philosophical innocent, replies, "By all means~ yes, Socrates" (5d2-6). In the same way, in the Hippias Major Hippias answers without hesitation that the just are just by justice, the...