Abstract
The mass/count distinction attracts a lot of attention among cognitive scientists, possibly because it involves in fundamental ways the relation between language (i.e. grammar), thought (i.e. extralinguistic conceptual systems) and reality (i.e. the physical world). In the present paper, I explore the view that the mass/count distinction is a matter of vagueness. While every noun/concept may in a sense be vague, mass nouns/concepts are vague in a way that systematically impairs their use in counting. This idea has never been systematically pursued, to the best of my knowledge. I make it precise relying on supervaluations (more specifically, ‘data semantics’) to model it. I identify a number of universals pertaining to how the mass/count contrast is encoded in the languages of the world, along with some of the major dimensions along which languages may vary on this score. I argue that the vagueness based model developed here provides a useful perspective on both. The outcome (besides shedding light on semantic variation) seems to suggest that vagueness is not just an interface phenomenon that arises in the interaction of Universal Grammar (UG) with the Conceptual/Intentional System (to adopt Chomsky’s terminology), but it is actually part of the architecture of UG.
Highlights
The mass/count distinction keeps being at the center of much attention among cognitive scientists, as it involves in fundamental ways the relation between language, thought and reality
While every noun/concept may in a sense be vague, mass nouns/concepts are vague in a way that systematically impairs their use in counting
Shape based classifiers, or very unspecific ones like ge either do not combine with prototypical mass nouns or force a count interpretation on them, as we saw in example (13c) of the previous section
Summary
The present section is devoted to a quick review of the assumptions I will be making. Quantity (in the singular) is slightly degraded in combination with singular count nouns This may suggest that quantity combines felicitously with expressions denoting something over which the ≤-relation is (non trivially) defined, i.e. plural count and mass properties (like apples or gold) and plural count or mass definite NPs. Part is instead defined over individuals (expressions of type e) regardless of whether they are sums or singularities. While quantity is primarily defined over properties of sums (bare plurals or bare singulars), part appears to be primarily defined over individuals, which suggests that the basic type of part is , i.e. that of functions from entities into sets of entities. It is my hope that the present approach contributes to a better understanding of this fundamental divide
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
