Abstract
The source and path verification in path-aware Internet consider the two critical issues: (1) end hosts could verify that their forwarding decisions followed by the network, (2) both intermediate routers and destination host could authenticate the source of packets and filter the malicious traffic. Unfortunately, the current verification mechanism requires validation operations in each router on the path in an inter-domain environment, thus requiring high communication and computation overhead, reducing its usefulness; besides, it is also difficult to meet the dynamic requirements of the end host. Ideally, the verification should be secure and provide the customized capability to meet the end host’s requirements. We propose a new mechanism called source and path verification based on Multi-AS-Key (MASK). Instead of each packet verified and marked at each router on the path, MASK improves the verification by empowering the end hosts to instruct the routers to achieve the verification, thus decreasing the router’s overhead while ensuring security performance to meet the end host’s requirements. With the plausible design, the communication overhead for realistic path lengths is 3–8 times smaller than the state-of-the-art mechanisms. The computation overhead in the routers is 2-5 times smaller. We implement our design in the BMv2 environment and commodity Barefoot Tofino programmable switch, demonstrating that MASK introduces significantly less overhead than the existing mechanisms.
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