Abstract
In this paper we propose a new theoretical explanation for the existence of male marriage wage premium, based entirely on search frictions. We analyse the interaction of frictional labour and marriage markets. We present and explore a search equilibrium characterised by wage dispersion where only high earning men get married. We also examine other equilibria where the marriage market may or may not influence labour market outcomes.
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