Marriage entry, divorce and reconciliation: The unintended consequence of the home purchase restriction policy in China

Abstract

This study investigates the unintended socioeconomic consequences of housing market regulations, focusing on the home purchase restriction (HPR) policy implemented in cities across China. While the primary aim of the HPR policy is to curb property prices by limiting the number of properties a household can purchase, its broader impact on family formation, particularly marriage and divorce patterns, remains underexplored. Applying Becker’s economic theory of marriage, which views marital decisions as rational choices influenced by socioeconomic factors, this study examines how the HPR policy affects family formation and dissolution across different city tiers and age groups in China. Our analysis reveals several key findings. First, the HPR policy effectively contributed to a decrease in house prices, aligning with its primary objective. However, it also led to delayed marriages among younger age groups, especially in first-tier cities, where housing affordability is a significant concern. Second, the policy inadvertently encouraged strategic divorces, allowing couples to circumvent purchase restrictions and acquire additional properties. This loophole undermines the policy’s effectiveness in reducing housing demand and stabilizing prices. These results highlight the complex interplay between housing market regulations and family demographics, emphasizing the need for policymakers to consider the broader societal impacts of non-family-oriented policies. As China, like many other societies, faces challenges related to the second demographic transition—such as declining marriage and fertility rates—the findings of this study serve as a cautionary tale. Housing policies, while effective in addressing market concerns, can have significant and sometimes counterproductive effects on family stability and formation, potentially exacerbating the demographic trends a society aims to mitigate.