Markus B. Liegl, China’s Use of Military Force in Foreign Affairs: the Dragon Strikes

Abstract

Following the programme of market reforms initiated in the late 1970s by Deng Xiaoping, the economy of China has grown at an unprecedented pace and scale. As a result of this extraordinary process, China has become the second-largest economy in the world, and is now playing an increasingly influential role in the global economic order. This ambitious economic expansion has contextually boosted the country’s military ambitions. Thus, after several years of double-digit defence spending increases, China is today the world’s second-highest military spender. Perhaps not surprisingly, Beijing’s economic and military transformation has become the epicentre of a passionate discussion among Western, and especially American, commentators, contributing to make the rise of China a prominent issue in international relations (IR) scholarship. Will China disrupt the status quo and challenge the extant ruling power, namely the USA? In doing so, will it adopt an increasingly belligerent attitude? Many different, and often conflicting, answers have been given to these questions. Liegl’s book seeks to contribute to this important debate by examining four past cases of China’s use of force in foreign affairs, namely the intervention in Korea in the early 1950s (Chapter 3), the conflict with India in 1962 (Chapter 4), the border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969 (Chapter 5) and the offensive launched against Vietnam in 1979 (Chapter 6). The book draws on insights from Lebow’s cultural theory of IR, which, contrary to traditional IR theories, promotes a more comprehensive understanding of the role of non-material elements such as honour, standing and status in international politics (Chapter 2). Liegl’s first set of findings fully comply with Lebow’s model. Specifically, the author concludes that in none of the four empirical cases studied in the book did China go to war to protect national interests or make territorial gains; instead, the motives behind the decision to use force were primarily non-material. According to Liegl, China intervened in Korea to increase its international status; it used military force against India because of the latter’s refusal to take its powerful neighbour seriously; it engaged in armed clashes with the Soviet Union in response to a perceived attempt at intimidation; and, finally, it launched an offensive against Vietnam as a form of punishment for the latter’s provocative and disrespectful attitudes.