Abstract
We study the Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) of an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. We establish the existence of MPEs and show that MPE payoffs are not necessarily unique. A method for constructing pure strategy MPEs for high discount factors is developed. For some networks, we find that all MPEs are asymptotically inefficient as players become patient.
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