Abstract
A liberalism that does not close its eyes to the constitutional level of choice must seek to extend the same fundamental logic that it applies in its theory of the market to the questions of what the sovereignty of the individual can mean, and how it can be secured, in constitutional matters. The problems that arise with such an extension to the constitutional level may well be more difficult than those that the liberal theory of the market has to deal with, and the conclusions that a constitutional liberalism arrives at may be less determinate that what the free-market approach pronounces. Yet, if these difficulties are inherent in the subject matter, and if the indeterminacy follows from arguments that we are required to accept, then denying them does not seem to be a promising strategy for strengthening the liberal paradigm.
Published Version
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