Abstract
Abstract Lending marketplaces aimed at directly connecting retail lenders and borrowers retreat from auctions and, instead, set prices and allocate credit on their own, despite evidence that retail investors possess valuable soft and nonstandard information. We investigate this puzzle by analyzing a unique data set of 7,455 auctions and 34 million bids from a leading British peer-to-business platform. We find that the platform was vulnerable to liquidity shocks, resulting in sizable deviations from information efficiency. Deviations increased over time because of a growing role played by noncrowd players, particularly large investors and algorithms.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
