Abstract
We examine the determinants of the levels of forward contracting preferred by generators and buyers of electricity. Increased forward contracting systematically reduces the variance of a generator's profit, so a generator prefers higher levels of forward contracting as market uncertainty or its aversion to risk increases. In contrast, increased forward contracting can either increase or reduce the variance of a buyer's profit. Consequently, a buyer can prefer either reduced or increased levels of forward contracting as market uncertainty or its aversion to risk increases.
Published Version
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