Abstract
Using publicly available bidder level bids data for Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCCs) and the realized awards of TCCs in the NYISO monthly reconfiguration auctions from June 2000 to December 2004, we examine both market performance and bidders' bidding behavior in the auctions. The data show significant under-pricing in the realized awards of TCCs. Theories suggest that under-pricing may arise from risk-aversion, monopsonistic market power or winner's curse. Our empirical analysis illustrates that all of the three effects play a role in the NYISO TCCs market. Both market performance and bidders' bidding strategies can be best explained by the theoretical model with asymmetric information and risk-averse bidders.
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