Market penalty, collective punishment, and buffering: A study on the insurance‐like effect of CSR in environmental violations

Abstract

AbstractWhile the existing literature finds that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can provide insurance‐like protection in negative events, it remains unclear how CSR buffers firms from market penalties for negative events. To address this concern, we conduct event studies and regressions using data from the environmental violations by Chinese publicly traded companies and their interlocked companies from 2009 to 2021. Our results show that the market reacts negatively to environmental violations. The market penalty diffuses through director networks and leads to the collective punishment of interlocked firms. CSR has an insurance‐like effect that buffers market penalties and collective punishment for environmental violations. Long‐term CSR has a stronger insurance‐like effect than short‐term CSR. Additionally, the insurance‐like effect of CSR still exists during repeated environmental violation events. This paper contributes to the literature on the insurance‐like effect of CSR and provides a reference for corporate CSR practice and investors' CSR decisions.