Market Evaluation Versus Reputation: Two Approaches to CEO Overcompensation and Effects on CSR

Abstract

This study explores the impact of CEO overcompensation from two perspectives, the economic-based view and the cognition- based view, on the socially responsible activities of the firms. To compare the behavioral differences for each compensation, we defined CEO overcompensation into two types: (1) internal overcompensation (CEO compensation relative to average compensation of other executives) and (2) external overcompensation (CEO compensation relative to average labor market rate). Using a sample of 6,269 firms and 1,076 CEOs over more than a decade, we found that internal overcompensation dampened CSR efforts due to strong CEO internal dominance power pursuing their imminent self-interests. By contrast, external overcompensation enhanced CSR performance because of the CEOs’ personal desire to preserve their status. Moreover, age, industry CSR performance, and the firm’s financial performance moderated the main relationships, supporting the contingent roles of CEO overcompensation, highlighting distinct interests in personal reputation versus market evaluation. Age and industry CSR positively moderated the effect of external overcompensation on CSR, and financial performance fulfilled a similar but apposite function on the relationship between internal CEO power effects and investments toward CSR activities. In sum, contradicting CSR performance resulted from different approaches were supported.