Abstract
Market discipline is a regulatory mechanism which has as its main task the punishment of bad risk management by financial institutions. Subordinated debt holders are considered by the literature as the most propitious private agent to discipline the financial institutions. The key to prove the existence of market discipline is to show the relationship between banks’ asset prices and its respective risks. The main objective of this article is an empirical analysis of the relation between credit risk (ratings and accounting information) and debentures return for the Brazilian case. The results denote a weak presence of market discipline in Brazil.
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