Market-Based Air Traffic Flow Control with Competing Airlines

Abstract

To advance efficient and equitable use of the U.S. National Airspace System during weather disruptions, air traffic management is modeled as a network flow optimization program that explicitly incorporates airline preference information. Market mechanisms are proposed to perform distributed computation of efficient solutions based on novel cost metrics that accurately reflect the cost of delays to the airlines. Two distinct types of network flow models are presented to demonstrate the tradeoff between computational complexity and control input flexibility. The discrete path flow model describes a simplified approach by fixing flow velocity and limiting rerouting options, thereby satisfying the primary assumptions of general equilibrium theory to ensure efficiency of the market outcome. The continuous link flow model allows additional control inputs to better align with current methods used in dealing with adverse weather conditions; namely, ground-delay programs, miles-in-trail restrictions, and flight reroutes. The market-mechanism outcome for both models is shown to be preferred by all airlines over a solution determined without incorporating preference information. Simulation results are presented for feasible problem sizes of both flow models and demonstrate the gains that can be achieved by implementing market mechanisms for air traffic management.