Mark Harris as a Naturalistic Theist: The Perspective of the Model of Levels of Analysis

Piotr Bylica

doi:10.53763/fag.2015.12.109

Abstract

Presently, naturalistic theism is the dominant position in the debate on the relation between science and religion, defending a thesis that the conflict between science and religion is only an apparent one. Also, this version of theism accepts the naturalist assumptions behind contemporary science and attempts to reformulate the beliefs held within the traditional Christian theism in order to present the religious view of reality as not conflicting with the scientific picture of the world. Certain assumptions behind Mark Harris’s views on the relations between science and religion can be described as consistent with naturalistic theism. The model of levels of analysis helps to analyze the most important themes found within naturalistic theism and show how these are described in the works of Harris. The model facilitates the identification of the relations between particular kinds of assumptions behind the position taken from the point of view of naturalistic theism in the debate on the relation between science and religion. The list of most frequently recurring assumptions — that are also important in Harris’s writings — include: the general division of epistemic competence, which assumes theology (religion) to be competent in dealing with the metaphysical issues (Levels 1 and 2) and science to be the only one competent to deliver the empirical statements describing processes and entities found within the empirical sphere (Levels 4 and 5); the acceptance of the naturalistic assumptions behind contemporary science (Level 2) and skepticism toward the religious notions found in the traditional Christian theism describing supernatural interventions and toward the dualist interpretation of human soul (Level 3). This leads to the acceptance of purely scientific, naturalistic, explanations of the events found within the empirical sphere and to skepticism toward the literal meaning of descriptions of empirical events (Level 5) that are not consistent with the anti-interventionist assumptions behind science. Harris’s acceptance of naturalistic theism in terms of the relation between science and religion and his use of the techniques found in the modern biblical scholarship have led him to the ideas of plurality of meanings and the lack of one definite truth with respect to the specific issues he deals with. From the point of view of MLA it is the rejection of super-naturalistic assumptions of the traditional Christian theism and the acceptance of the naturalistic assumptions of science that seems to be the cause of lack of definite truth in his theological explanations.

Highlights

In 2013, Harris published a book entitled The Nature of Creation: Examining the Bible and Science. 2 This title, can be considered a domi-G nant theme of a number of his publications dealing with the relation between science and religion
The focus is on the aspects of his approach that are consistent with naturalistic theism which accepts naturalistic assumptions of science and denies dualist and interventionist assumptions of traditional Christian theism
A of his postulates are presented in the subsequent part of this article). In his own F words: “The «classical» field of Science and Religion, defined by the work of scholars such as Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne from the 1960s to the early 2000s, is being rapidly superseded these days, as we discover more and more crucial areas of engagement between the two disciplines”. 5 In Harris’s publications, this development takes a form of an analysis of specific problems within the general frames, which have already been investigated by the abovementioned scholars

Summary

Introduction

In 2013, Harris published a book entitled The Nature of Creation: Examining the Bible and Science. 2 This title, can be considered a domi-. The rejection of dualism and interventionism (Level 2), assumed in the statements of the particular domains of sciences (Level 3), is related to the postulate of methodological naturalism: scientific explanations should not use supernatural factors in explaining the natural phenomena Combining this postulate with the mentioned division of epistemic competences leads to the conclusion that within science any reference either to the interventions of supernatural factors or to nonmaterial soul in describing the events observable in the empirical world are not considered valid. It is important to notice that even though naturalistic theists reject interventions but not the possibility of a non-interventionist special divine action in nature They use certain notions, as described by Level 3 statements, in order to explain how God can influence particular events in the world. A large proportion of world religions seems to be excluded from the “open dialogue” between science and religion

Conclusion

Summary