Abstract
Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle (1623-73), was a prolific writer with a strong interest in science. Her work, long ignored, has recently been garnering serious critical attention. This article considers her Observations on Experimental Philosophy as more than just a critique of the Royal Society's mechanistic science. Whilst she was certainly responding to other scientific texts she read, Cavendish also practised her own version of natural philosophy, one that relied on observation to support her objections to Robert Hooke and other Royal Society scientists. Hers was a scientific practice that relied on passive observation rather than invasive experiment. As an early modern woman interested innatural philosophy, she demonstrates concernfor herreaders' abilities to comprehend difficult texts, and she models herself as a reader of scientific texts and a practitioner of science herself.
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