Abstract
I discuss the adequacy of Marcus's proposals for handling substitution-failure (opacity) of various kinds. I argue that, instead of imposing substitution-permitting logical forms on the problematic examples, as she recommended, it is preferable to construct systems of inference in which substitution-permitting forms are inferred from substitution-resisting ones
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More From: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
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