Mao's Generals: Chen Yi and the New Fourth Army (review)

After the Second World War, a bipolar world, known as the Cold War Era, has been clearly formed between the Western Bloc and Communist Bloc while the United States and the Soviet Union at the peak on each side. In Eastern Europe, the United States was restrained and felt helpless about Soviet expansion in this area with the perception of Yalta system. On the other hand, in Asia, with the breakdown of talks, an all-out war resumed. A Chinese civil war fought between Kuomintang (also as KMT or Chinese National Party) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At the end of 1948, KMT has occupied the inferior position. In the early period of 1949, CCP forces crossed the Yangtze River and successfully captured Nanking, the capital of KMT’s Republic of China (PRC) government. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with its capital at Beiping, which was renamed Beijing. Chiang Kai-shek and millions of Nationalist Chinese retreated from mainland China to the island of Taiwan. Confronted with the CCP takeover of mainland China, the United States came to reformulate its China Policy which later marked a turning point in Sino-American relationship during the period of 1949 to the middle 1950. In June 1948, the leader of Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, was officially denounced and his party, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), was ejected as a member of the Cominform by the Soviet Union. Since the West branded Tito a Soviet puppet for his loyalty and constancy of faith to Stalinism, the Tito-Stalin Split presented a whole new realm of possibilities to the United States for its dilemma in china—“Chinese Titoism.” With the influence of Stilwell Incident over Sino-American relationship and the facts of Tito-Stalin Split, Truman made an about-face change to U.S. China Policy in 1949. By the early 1949, the Truman Administration has already been making plans to diverge from Chiang and his KMT such as the publication of China White Paper; at the same time, Truman Administration keeping making chances to have conversations with the CCP. By meeting and negotiating with the CCP officials, Truman Administration attempted to disunite Communist China and the Soviet Union, expected Mao to be the “Asian Tito,” and then Communist China can joint forces with the United States to fight against the Soviet Union, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Until the outbreak of Korean War in June 1950, the United States finally realized that what it faced is hostile china along with the Sino-Soviet partnership. By applying Graham T. Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and the Governmental Politics Model (GPM) as the theoretical structure and basis, the thesis would step by step explore the decision-making process of Truman Administration in engaging China to counter the threat from the Soviet Union during the period of 1949 to the middle 1950 through the perspectives of the rational assessment and choice on national interest, struggles between/among organizations based on different target and organizational culture, and pulling, hauling and bargaining games among relative bureaucrats. In addition, the thesis also applied the principles from Alexander L. George’s book, Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy, to aim at examining how President Truman’s, who has the final say, character, personality, value and world views made effect in the decision-making process of the target case study. In the process of theory confirming, the thesis discovered that by the period of transformation of Chinese regimes in 1949, the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948 presented the United States a new inspiration for the Communist World, that is, the Eastern Bloc is not a rigid “Iron Curtain.” Truman Administration considered that Titoism may set its roots upon China, the Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict could be a replay situation that occurred in mainland China, and both would put the strategic thought—Engaging China to counter the Soviet Threat—into practice. Nevertheless, from the historical perspectives, this kind of strategic thought seemed over-optimistic, which did not conform to fully rational considerations. However, with regard to the background of the early Cold War Era and the suspicion between the Truman Administration and KMT, the alternative that the United States took reflected the principles of “bounded rationality model.” As a result, by examining the decision-making process of Truman Administration in engaging China to counter the threat from the Soviet Union during the period of 1949 to the middle 1950, what the thesis explored not only the facts about the Sino-American relationship in this period, but also the continuity and change of Truman’s China Policy along with its cause and effect.

Like Regime, Like Newspaper: Comparative Analysis on Newspaper Industries across Taiwan Strait (1949-1958) Abstract Ever since 1949, across Taiwan strait, the Republic of China on Taiwan ruled by Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuo Min Tang, KMT) and the People’s Republic of China on Chinese Mainland ruled by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were antagonist to each other for a long time. Far-reaching changes were mandated both in Taiwan and Mainland China by the two regimes while communications between people on both sides of Taiwan strait were banned, and later vanished. Thus, to all professions across Taiwan strait, two groups of numerous experiments were performed at the same time. The experiences and consequences of these experiments influenced the working conditions, lives and cultures on both territories and evidenced distinction between the two national systems. As the most important media at the time, newspaper industry was highly regarded by both KMT and CCP. Although in the beginning of the political separation, newspaper industries across Taiwan strait were quite similar, the many newspaper policies raised by the two governments molded different environments for the industry. Experiments of newspaper industry under different regimes were taken place from then on. Within ten years, the newspaper industries evolved seperately across the strait, and around 1958, divergent newspaper systems appeared. Newspaper industry in Mainland China became a typical example of the industry under totalitarian regime, while newspaper industry in Taiwan showed itself a model of the industry under authoritarian regime. Base on the above historical background, what was the mechanism that caused and shaped different newspaper industries across Taiwan strait? How did newspaper industry respond to totalitarian or authoritarian ruling? What factors that differentiated authoritarianism from totalitarianism can be reached through the examples in newspaper industry? These questions reckon the necessity of comparative study on the same industry in two isolated and widely different regions during the same time period. This dissertation tries to be contributive to the answers. Newspaper industry is considered and studied here with its entire functionality. Not only are news reporting, editing and editorial writing examined, but newspaper’s producing, sales and management are also studied. Comparative historical analysis is applied as the main methodology with the assistance of knowledges from journalism, political science, sociology, business administration and accounting. Acknowledging newapapers as the “tongue and throat to the party” and tool for propaganda, CCP spared no effort to control newspaper industry. However, it’s means and artifices were nimble and flexible. From 1949, CCP elaborated a government-owned hierarchy newspaper system. Party leaders directed newspapers owned and operated by central to local governments, while tolerated temporary existence of some privately-owned newspapers. Following the establishment of the regime, CCP seized newspaper industry’s resources such as manpower, materials, financial supply, news announcing, circulation channels and market throughout Mainland China. The number of remaining privately-owned newspapers and circulation and advertising agent houses declined sharply and eventually died out in a few years. When CCP had monopolized the newspaper industry, consequently, it had monopolized the social capitals contained in the industry. Newspapers in the totalitarian country became part of the regime itself. On the other side of the strait, the retreating and exhausted KMT faced difficulties inside and outside Taiwan. For surviving, the adoption of a two-handed policy, with both suppressions and compromises was inevitable, which made the ROC of Taiwan an authoritarian country. Government’s publication moratorium and journalistic taboos set walls around newspaper industry, but also kept potential competitors away. Among the coexisting, fixed-numbered newspapers, those owned by government or KMT were in leading positions in 1949. However, due to the realism of authoritarianism, some “reservations,” such as social and crime news, popular supply and circulation markets, and advertisements had been made by the government for other newspapers to maneuver their future with free competition in these areas. Privately-owned newspapers utilized the opportunities created by these “reservations” to compete capitalistically. In ten years, resources contained in Taiwanese societies were gradually excavated and transferred to privately-owned newspapers when social capitals were being accumulated by them; meanwhile government- and KMT-owned newspapers began to ebb. Preparation for privately-owned newspapers to meet the further economic development and foundation for them to exceed government- and KMT-owned newspapers were established in this period of time. Ten years were short in history, yet long enough to create two completely different newspaper industries in two areas that were politically separated and isolated to each other. It was the decade right after the split in 1949 that the two regimes across Taiwan strait, CCP’s totalitarian and KMT’s authoritarian, formed newspaper industries based on each one’s political ideology. So ten years are long enough to have a specific newspaper industry appear under a regime’s specific ruling. Sensitive to its environment as any other news media is, newspaper industry is a product of the regime that brings about the media industry’s environment. Like regime, like newspaper.

Reviewed by: Finding Women in the State: A Socialist Feminist Revolution in the People's Republic of China, 1949–1964 by Zheng Wang Aminda Smith Finding Women in the State: A Socialist Feminist Revolution in the People's Republic of China, 1949–1964 by Zheng Wang. Oakland: University of California Press, 2017. Pp. xv + 380. $85.00 cloth, $34.95 paper, $34.95 e-book. I recently attended a lecture by a well-known China watcher who is often cited for her expertise on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies related to women and gender equality. When an audience member asked whether there were contestations, over antifeminist policies, between the Party leadership and officials in the Women's Federation (Funü lianhehui 妇女联合会, or Fulian), the speaker responded by claiming that the Fulian cannot be considered a feminist organization as it is simply an arm of the Party. While this claim is not entirely false, it is misleading. Moreover, such a position is all too common in the reportage and scholarship on the People's Republic of China (PRC): the CCP is often portrayed as a thoroughly patriarchal, Borg-like monolith, just as masculinist and oppressive to women as any other modern state power, despite its early claims to the contrary. Thus, Zheng Wang's forceful and convincing argument to the contrary makes her new book a crucial intervention in the fields of PRC history and the history of Chinese feminism. As her title suggests, among [End Page 408] Party members and PRC state leaders, Wang finds committed feminist women, who truly endeavored to bring about a socialist feminist revolution. Finding Women in the State, organized into two parts and eight chapters, considers the work of Chinese Communist feminists through a series of cases. Because Wang's argument requires the close reading and unpacking of extremely rich and detailed source materials, her chapters are quite dense. And her discussion is so wide-ranging that one sometimes senses at least two different books in this one volume. But in the end, all of the pieces coalesce around Wang's answer to an important historiographical question: how do we evaluate the CCP's famous claim to have liberated women, epitomized in Mao Zedong's all-too-oft-quoted pronouncement that "women hold up half the sky"? The research conducted over the past several decades suggests one answer: Chinese women were, and remain, partially liberated—thanks to the whims of a male-dominated and patriarchal Communist Party that nevertheless maintained its rhetoric supporting gender equality and thus sporadically promoted women's rights when doing so did not undermine other Party goals. Wang shows, however, that what appears to be a series of half-hearted and superficial concessions made by a masculinist state are actually evidence of hard-won victories achieved by women working in the Women's Federation and other Party-state units; these feminists were truly committed to the Maoist claim that women's liberation was central to China's socialist revolution. Wang does not deny that the sites in which state feminists worked, such as the Women's Federation, were inseparable parts of the Communist Party. Indeed, it was enthusiasm for socialism's liberatory promise that led these women to join the revolution. Those feminists who held positions within the PRC state certainly demonstrated their loyalty to the Party. Crucially, however, Wang shows that cadres and leaders who did women's work (funü gongzuo 妇女工作) also saw themselves as quasi-independent actors, dedicated to opposing patriarchy in Chinese society and in the Communist state. And their pursuit of a bona fide feminist agenda caused repeated clashes between state feminists and other Party members, including those in the central leadership. This book traces the histories of those state feminists committed to women's work. It demonstrates that while their battles were all uphill and against strong opposition from many Party men, [End Page 409] state feminists fought hard and sometimes successfully fomented real change for Chinese women. Wang reveals that the effects of state feminism can be seen everywhere during the socialist period, even in high-level Party policy and propaganda. She also argues, however, that historians must search for feminism in PRC history because it...

China's Expanding Engagement in Global Health Dennis Van Vranken Hickey (bio) For most of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, China was called, "the sick man of Asia (东亚病夫, dong ya bing fu)."1 But those days are over. As President Xi Jinping observed, "China has bid farewell to the problems that plagued its people for thousands of years, including hunger, shortages and poverty" (Yu 2019, 19). As described below, China is now one of the world's top economic, political and military powers. China: An Economic Power By the late 1970s, China had lived through more than a century of turmoil. Key drivers of the chaos included imperialist encroachment, the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), the Chinese Civil War between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT), a series of natural disasters and the unsound economic policies embraced by Chairman Mao Zedong after "liberation" in 1949. All of this changed after Deng Xiaoping became the supreme leader in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the late 1970s and launched the so-called "reform era." But the country's economy did not really take off until after Deng made his landmark journey south to Shenzhen in 1992 and accelerated the "reform and opening up" process.2 Figure 1 (below) shows China's astounding gross domestic product (GDP) growth from the early 1990s onward. Since the 1990s, China has experienced a transition from a largely agrarian society with a planned socialist economy into a global economic powerhouse. The CCP calls the new approach "market socialism" or "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and bristles at suggestions that it strongly resembles capitalism. Whatever one calls it, the transformation has enabled China to become the second largest economy in the world—enjoying a double-digit annual growth rate from 2000 to 2010 [End Page 327] and roughly 7 percent since then. In the past decade, millions of Chinese have joined the middle class which now numbers roughly 400 million and is expected to exceed 550 million by 2022 (Iskyan 2016). The exploding middle class is playing a part in a governmental strategy that is expected to help the country's economy transition away from dependence on exports and toward domestic consumption (Zhang 2019). It appears that China is well on its way toward achieving the CCP's stated goal of creating a "moderately well-off society" by 2021. Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 1. China's GDP Growth in Current US Dollars Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2017&locations=CN&start=1961&view=chart. China: A Political Power As China's economy has exploded, the country's political influence has likewise grown. To be sure, economic partnerships seem to have largely paved the way. The PRC has surpassed the United States as the largest trading partner of numerous countries in the global south—particularly those in Africa and Latin America. And the country is "expected to spend over US$1 trillion on its "Belt and Road" initiative (BRI)—seven times the size of the Marshal plan in real dollars" (US Global Leadership Coalition 2018). [End Page 328] This ambitious project will integrate the economies of 65 countries that include 70 percent of the world's population, 30 percent of the GDP, and 75 percent of the earth's energy reserves. The land-based version of the new Silk Road consists of a series of economic corridors connecting the PRC with nations in Central and Western Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The sea-based Silk Road will traverse the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and eventually connect China to Central Asia, Africa and Europe. China has pledged not to transform itself into a "global hegemon" that "bullies" other countries (Yu 2019). Still, some suspect Beijing's motives as the government's leadership has increasingly pointed to the Chinese approach to development as an alternative pathway for states in the global south to follow. It has even established alternative international organizations—most notably the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)—to help the...

The early relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) is regarded as an important issue in contemporary Chinese history, but the explanation of this phenomenon has differed for a long time. There is a major dispute in controversy in interpretations of this event. Some hold that the KMT ”accommodated Communists,” and the CCP insists that the Communists ”allied with the KMT,” The CCP realized that allying with the KMT was the correct choice at the time, and it was also in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist revolution strategy. Why dose the CCP say so? And what is the truth? This essay, from the perspective of the history of the Chinese Communist movement, attempts to understand what the CCP means by the ”historical conditions of the time?” Why was cooperation with the KMT the right historical choice? Is it possible or not to say, from the point of view of the CCP, that joining the KMT was ”the only choice?” In the 1920's, both parties were facing the difficulties of social mobilization, and there also existed the complementary interaction for revolutionary identification. In fact, the CCP leaders of that time clearly recognized that the only method which Dr. Sun Yet-sen would accept was that Communists could join the KMT as individuals, instead of as a group under the name of the CCP. On the other hand, because the Comintern was supporting both the CCP and the KMT, if the CCP did not join the KMT, the Comintern might have had to choose between the two parties. Since the danger of losing the support of the Comintern was much greater than that of joining the KMT, we may say that for the CCP, joining the KMT was in fact the one and only choice they had at the time.

Reviewed by: From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936 Gordon Y. M. Chan (bio) Chan Lau Kit-Ching . From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. ix, 342 pp. Hardcover $59.95, ISBN 0-312-22428-1. As Professor Chan Lau Kit-Ching aptly observes, Hong Kong's first encounter with Chinese Communism predates July 1, 1997. It has been involved in the Chinese Communist movement ever since the movement's inception in 1921, and for many years before the Communist takeover in 1949 Hong Kong had served as headquarters for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Guangdong. The examination of this previously neglected history promises to shed light on our knowledge of the revolutionary movement not just in the locality of Hong Kong but also in Guangdong and the Chinese nation as a whole (pp. 1-2). Based in Hong Kong, Chan enjoyed a favorable position while exploring this topic. Besides ready access to local archives, both government and private, the proximity of Hong Kong to Guangzhou allowed her to conduct archival research conveniently in the Guangdong Provincial Archives, which hosts the most comprehensive collection of pre-1949 Party documents on Guangdong (including Hong Kong) accessible to both Chinese and foreign historians.1 Furthermore, the Feng Ping Shan Library at the University of Hong Kong has an impressive and expanding acquisition of historical materials on the CCP in Guangdong, published [End Page 412] both publicly and internally in the People's Republic of China (PRC). These resources were within "easy reach" (p. 12) for Chan, who teaches at the University. Given Chan's obvious advantages, the outcome of her research is, however, disappointing. Notwithstanding some shrewd observations, this present work is marred by a marked unfamiliarity with the historiography of the Chinese Communist Revolution. A quick historiographical survey will refute Chan's belief that there is "a dearth of regional studies of the Chinese Communist Movement, especially in the English language" (p. 2). Over the last two decades, Western scholarship has produced intensive studies of the revolution in local contexts,2 although they are predominantly rural in focus. Chan's study could well be a valuable contribution to the underrepresentation of the Chinese Communist urban revolution in the recent literature. Unfortunately, her lack of awareness of many major issues at stake, coupled with her reluctance to discuss the possible implications of her own findings with other scholars in order to enhance our general understanding of the CCP's history, suggests otherwise. The structure of this book is simple. Its four main parts trace the history of the CCP in Hong Kong and Guangdong from 1921 to 1936. The story begins with the small Guangzhou Communism Group that was initiated, in 1921, by Chen Duxiu, together with three Guangdong students he had taught in Beijing who had been exposed to the "new thoughts" of the May Fourth Movement. About a year later, the Socialist Youth League, which was to be superseded by the Communist Youth League in 1925, was established in the province. This organization represented the earliest Communist presence in Hong Kong (the CCP was not founded in the colony until 1924). As a British colony, Hong Kong expectedly exhibited many political and socioeconomic features distinct from those of Guangdong. The awareness of their existence impelled many Hong Kong cadres to ask their superiors on the other side of the border for special treatment and greater autonomy in pursuing revolutionary activities. Several times Chan emphasizes that these appeals mark the initial conception of "one country two systems"—a principle that the PRC employed to resolve the colonial questions of Hong Kong and Macao. The inference drawn here is interesting. Readers should bear in mind, however, that the desire of the regional Party branches for more autonomy based on concerns about their peculiar local conditions was common in the early history of the CCP and was by no means unique to the Communists in Hong Kong.3 Before 1925, Communists had made little headway in Hong Kong; it took the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike/Boycott to bolster their position. Because of this...

This article revisits Chiang Kai‐shek's Kuomintang (KMT) party‐state during the Nanjing Decade (1927–37) of the Republic of China (ROC) and assesses how the actions and ideological propensities of the Nationalist regime affected prewar China's external relations with the United States. While both the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were constituted as Leninist parties in the 1920s, due to the Soviet Union's military and economic aid for Sun Yat‐sen's republican revolution, they had very different political objectives and socioeconomic perspectives on China's state/nation‐building. Consequently, the KMT's and CCP's respective attitudes towards the United States also differed. Though Leninism is an antithesis to Western liberal democracy, it is not inevitable for a Leninist dictatorship to engage in confrontations with Washington, as the central leadership's inclinations and actions would determine how China approaches America. Chiang's Confucian Leninism opened up the friendly ties with the United States in 1928, which eventually consolidated into a strong U.S.‐ROC alliance during WWII and beyond, despite the KMT's autocracy. The essay will contrast briefly with the post‐1949 People's Republic of China (PRC), as the CCP experienced from Mao Zedong's radical Leninism, Deng Xiaoping/Jiang Zemin/Hu Jintao's consultative Leninism, to Xi Jinping's expansionist Leninism today. The evolving CCP positions have also affected the extent of cooperation and hostility between Beijing and Washington and illustrated how the changing attributes of the Chinese Leninist regime are crucial in determining U.S.‐PRC strategic trajectories.

When Mao Zedong shouted loudly, “The central people’s government of the People's Republic of China is established today” at the Tiananmen tower on October 1 of 1949, that very moment not only symbolized the emergence of the Chinese Communist Party as the victor in the Chinese civil war, but also signaled the beginning of the geographical and political separation across the Strait. “The Republic of China” and “the People’s Republic of China” have taken their respective controls across the Taiwan Strait for more than 60 years and the cross-strait relations experienced “military standoff and hostile confrontation.” When Taiwan lifted the ban on visiting relatives in Mainland China in the 1980s, the stance of “mutual confrontation and zero contact” was transformed into the phase of “open and exchange; cold government and enthusiastic citizens” with military conflicts largely reduced. However, the two consecutive Taiwanese presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian proposed the highly contentious “special state-to-state relationship” and “one country on each side” respectively. This led to the complete lack of trust from both sides and the People’s Republic of China unilaterally shutting down the official communication channel. When Ma Ying-jeou took the presidency in 2008, the governments of both sides began to resume their roles as promoters of the normalization of the cross-strait relations under the principle of the “1992 Consensus.” Nevertheless, the “two political entities” have been established for more than 60 years which have developed their own politics, economics and cultures.Although the current cross-strait relations are having great future prospect, they are only limited to “economic” exchanges. The “political” aspect is still confined to the “One China” and “Taiwan independence” policies firmly held by the governments across the strait. In addition, the potential “party alteration” in Taiwan every four years creates more uncertainty to the cross-strait stability. Although the cross-strait relations have witnessed a U-turn, the subjective and objective factors surrounding the person in power inevitably affect the cross-strait relations. Taiwan witnessed its first party alteration in 2000 when the KMT ended its rule for more than 50 years. Chen Shui-bian’s successful bid to the presidency was then confronted with issues such as how to break the cross-strait deadlock and the direction of Taiwan’s economic development in view of China’s emerging economic power. As a result, it is worth examining in details how the China policy was formulated and the effects thereof under Chen Shui-bian’s government amid pressures from both the United States and China internationally and the resistance from the opposition party domestically. Finally, the research conclusion is drawn from the evaluation on how the Democratic Progress Party responses to China as China constantly pushes on the economic front without sacrificing Taiwan’s sovereignty at the Post- Chen Shui-bian era as the summary of this thesis.

Throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), disagreement has existed concerning the extent to which Chinese Communism might be considered authentically Marxist. In general, most of the available literature tends to simply accept the Chinese Communist self-identification as Marxist. No binding consensus among independent Sinologists, however, is found and resistance has taken on a variety of forms throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—some partisan and some genuinely analytic. The academic literature produced during the entire period of CCP rule in China has been characterized by wide differences in the acceptance of its Marxist authenticity. It has always been tacitly or explicitly accepted that the Marxism of the CCP at its founding in 1920–1921 was in a form acceptable to the Bolshevik rulers of revolutionary Russia. Having been founded directly through the influence of the Third (or Leninist) International, the CCP had to conform to the Bolshevik interpretation of Marxism. Since Lenin had taken “creative” liberties with the original doctrine, some have maintained that the Marxism of the CCP had never been truly Marxist. To add further difficulty to any analysis of the Marxism of the CCP, it is generally understood that Mao Zedong, who gradually assumed the leadership of the CCP, was not particularly well versed in any variant of Marxism. Over the years and under the pressure of circumstances, Mao delivered varied formulations of his revolutionary ideology. How much those formulations accorded with any variant of Marxism became a matter of interpretation. Some scholars hold that by the time of the “Great Leap Forward,” Mao had devised his own ideology. All of this speculation generated controversy within the CCP leadership. By the time of Mao’s demise in 1976, the doctrine of a “second revolution” animated Deng Xiaoping and his followers. It is still a matter of considerable controversy whether that post-Maoist doctrine, in any sense, is Marxist in content or aspiration.

In the winter of 1947 a teenaged girl from a small Shanxi village was beheaded with a hay-cutter-turned guillotine – Liu Hulan was another victim of the bloody Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949 in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party vied for control over the country. Her membership of the CCP and active involvement in its armed struggle within the local People's Militia drew her into danger as the village came into Nationalist hands. Within weeks of her execution, the CCP mobilised the story of Liu Hulan to rally support for its campaign. Mao Zedong himself declared that hers was ‘A great life and a glorious death’ and personally penned the calligraphy of this epithet that now graces the various memorials and materials constructed and produced in her honour. A peasant girl of enormous courage and bravery, defiant in the face of death and resistant to her captors’ demands that she recant her communist beliefs and betray her comrades, Hulan has been hailed as a heroic communist martyr for well over half a century.

International negotiations rarely occur under conditions of perfect or completely symmetric information. In the course of pursuing foreign policy, states withhold certain information and intentionally communicate that which is false or misleading. A particularly common instance of incomplete information is that occurring after a change in leadership. When a new government takes office, the nation’s policy positions inevitably undergo a major transition. A change of leadership while a state is conducting prolonged negotiations over long-term issues is likely to change both their trajectory and outcome. The other party concerned in such negotiations is unfamiliar with the new government and its ways, yet historical interaction has made its own circumstances and preferences commonly known to both sides. This is a situation of asymmetric information. The leadership transition of one state frequently arouses suspicions and feelings of insecurity in others, because they have no way of comprehending the actual policy preferences and positions of the new government. Changes in government leadership have engendered several asymmetric information scenarios in the course of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Around the time the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established, neither the Soviet Union (USSR) nor the major Western powers had any understanding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. They were suspicious and hesitant, often adopting a wait-and-see stance in their dealings with the new government. Following the Kuomintang (KMT) retreat to Guangzhou, for example, the USSR accordingly moved its Chinese embassy to the Guangdong capital, despite the ostensible bond of communism between the USSR and the Chinese communists. American ambassador to China, John Leighton Stuart is another example. Mao Zedong’s ‘leaning to one side’ concept notwithstanding, Stuart remained in Nanjing, and in August 1949 was prepared to visit the Chinese Communists in Beiping. The US knew too little about the Chinese communist leadership to be sure whether or not to broach a relationship with the new regime. It was in January, 1979, shortly after the Cultural Revolution and at the start of the open door policy, when the western world still knew little about the new generation of CCP leaders, that the Vice Premier of the State Council, Deng Xiaoping, and his wife Zhuo Lin accepted an invitation to a formal

Reviewed by: Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao by Michael Dillon Yafeng Xia (bio) Michael Dillon. Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2020. xi, 302 pp. Paperback $29.95, isbn 978-178-831-930-0. Among several books in English on the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (who served from 1949 to 1976), two stand out. The first, by Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, “explores the nature of” Zhou’s political behavior and assesses how such behavior affected twentieth-century Chinese history.1 The second, by former senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) historian Gao Wenqian, which is based on classified party documents and personal interviews with high-level party officials, provides a revisionist account of Zhou Enlai. This volume is an abridged English translation of Gao’s Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai’s Later Years), which, having been adapted for Western readers, includes the stories of Zhou’s earlier years prior to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and elaborates the political context of the Cultural Revolution and the behavior of other actors (chapters 2–7, pp. 21–104).2 Relying primarily on Chinese sources supplemented with writings by Western journalists who visited CCP bases during the War of Resistance against Japan and foreign diplomats stationed in Beijing in the 1950s and the 1960s, Michael Dillon presents a sympathetic account of Zhou’s life from his birth in 1898 to his death in 1976 in twenty-three chapters. This is a standard biography of Zhou, covering his childhood, education, upbringing, personality, political activism, and revolutionary activities, presenting a thorough picture of Zhou the diplomat and statesman. Dillon argues, “This private side of Zhou Enlai is one [End Page 263] of the reasons why he became the world’s favorite Chinese Communist, but Zhou’s character was complex” (p. viii). According to Dillon, Zhou “was a statesman rather than simply a political operator and achieved much on the international stage” (p. ix). But scholars on Zhou Enlai and the history of the CCP will not be pleased, as the book does not add much to what they have already known about Zhou. To correctly understand and evaluate Zhou’s historical role in the Chinese Communist movement and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it is crucial that we correctly understand Zhou’s relationship with Mao Zedong, the CCP Chairman and China’s paramount leader from 1949 to 1976. The reviewer cannot agree with several of Dillon’s major assertions, such as, “Zhou had remained personally close to Mao, never criticized him in public, and was himself never criticized openly :: : . Eventually he was attacked, viciously but covertly, by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing” (p. 264). I feel that the author is unfamiliar with some of the new findings on Zhou Enlai that have been revealed in the last two decades. In the following paragraphs, I try to set the record straight. The relationship between Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong has attracted much scholarly attention, and it is a key issue in our understanding of Chinese politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There are three popular models of the relationship: Zhou was a faithful follower of Mao; Zhou was a puppet of Mao; and Zhou was a moderating force on Mao, which is the version the official Chinese Communist historiography promotes.3 Dillon falls into the third model, as he writes, “During the Great Leap and particularly the Cultural Revolution, Zhou was in an impossible position. To survive, he said and did things he would have preferred not to. By surviving, he ensured a degree of damage limitation and protected many friends and colleagues” (p. 270). For years, Zhou was “the Beloved People’s Premier,” a sensitive and effective administrator and a moderating force in the PRC’s politics. He was good-looking, urbane, brilliant, and a master diplomat. He always valued the nation’s needs above his own. He managed to save hundreds of purged officials during the Cultural Revolution. But Gao Wenqian turns the tables on Zhou. According to Gao, Zhou was a tragic backroom schemer, a puppet of his master Mao, and a man who so rigorously observed a...

This dissertation examines the motivations, logic, and functions of media control in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Rather than telling the history of media control in modern China, or giving a comprehensive account of the techniques employed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to control the media, it investigates the origins of the CCP’s theoretical approach to the media, as well as the consequences of the resulting concepts for practical media work in the PRC. The first half of the thesis tracks the genesis of the Party’s media concept and reconstructs the conditions that contributed to its rise in the first half of the twentieth century; the chapters in the latter half follow this concept in its implementation through a number of case studies from the early 1950s through the late 1990s. Since the day of its founding, the CCP has placed great emphasis on questions of media and propaganda; after 1949 the party-state has claimed full control of the Chinese print, broadcast, and electronic media. Asking for the reasons behind this claim, I argue that it must be traced back to the Party’s desire to bring about the transformation of human consciousness and to create an environment conducive to this process, a utopian project informed as much by the Leninist version of Marxism as by Neo-Confucian ideas of education and state-society relations prevalent in the late imperial era. This project and its underlying fundamental assumptions have survived – in greatly transmuted form – to the present day and continue to inform the strict control of the Chinese media, even when such controls clash with other political and socio-economic interests of the Party-state. I propose to take the media as a variable to measure changes in the CCP’s approach to governance. The Party’s handling of the media serves as a mirror of state-society relations; consequently, the investigation into the media provides us with information on the CCP’s conceptions of governance under changing circumstances. I argue that over the past twenty years, the CCP has successfully altered and reinterpreted its vision of the state and its position therein; it has adopted a more flexible set of methods to achieve its fundamental political objectives. At the same time, however, the ultimate goals of the Party – originally formulated in Yan’an – have changed remarkably little.

The generally accepted view of the first United Front in China was that the Communist International (Comintern) initially proposed this policy in 1920, at approximately the same time that Marxist study groups were being formed into a communist party in China.' According to this view, an active policy of alliance between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (GMD) began in 1922, as a result of the intervention of Henk Sneevliet (Maring), an agent of the Moscow-based Comintern. These dates assume the existence of the CCP prior to the Comintern's adoption of the United Front, an interpretation that most recently published Western histories of the CCP accept.2 Not surprising, historians from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the former USSR also subscribe to this view because to do otherwise would devalue the CCP's role.3 However, this traditional view that the CCP was integral to the United Front is contradicted by a wealth of evidence showing that the Bolsheviks proposed this policy almost three years before the CCP was formed. In fact, Soviet officials first promoted an alliance with Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) during summer 1918 before there were any communists in China at all. The Comintern followed suit during spring 1919, more than a year before Marxist study groups were formed. Finally, with the Comintern's backing, in January 1921 Chen

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgement This research was successively supported by an Overseas Research Student Award of the UK and National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) (No. 51008137). Notes 1. Mao Tse-tung, 'Some Experiences in Our Party's History (September 25, 1956)', in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961). 2. Jack C. Westoby, '''Making Green the Motherland'': Forestry in China', in China's Road to Development, Neville Maxwell, ed. (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979), pp. 231–245. 3. Zhao Jijun 赵纪军, 'Sixty Years of Landscape Policies and Development in China (3): Making Green the Motherland' 新中国园林政策与建设 60年回眸(三)—绿化祖国. Landscape Architecture, 3, 2009, pp. 91–95. 4. The Mao era was considered in this study as from 1949 to 1978 despite Mao's death in 1976, since Hua Guofeng (1921–2008) who succeed as the chairman continued Mao's political orientation and policies by claiming that 'to support whatever policy decisions were made by Chairman Mao' and 'unswervingly follow whatever instructions were given by Chairman Mao'. A clear diversion of the policy was only made from the end of 1978 when the Reform and Opening-up Policy was initiated under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997). 5. For example, it was noted that foreigners visiting China during the Mao era were always subjected to tightly controlled itineraries to pilot projects, according to an interview with Professor Wang Shaozeng, currently editor of Chinese Landscape Architecture, 12 June 2009. This was also mentioned in: Anne-Marie Broudehoux, The Making and Selling of Post-Mao Beijing (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 30–32. 6. The Third Internal Revolutionary War, commonly known as the War of Liberation (1945–1949), was fought between the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The latter led by Mao Zedong defeated the former in mainland China where the founding of the People's Republic of China was announced on 1 October 1949 on Tiananmen, Beijing. 7. Joseph W. Esherick, Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900–1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawai' Press, 2000), p. 1. 8. Lu Duanfang, Remaking Chinese Urban Form: Modernity, Scarcity and Space, 1949–2005 (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), p. 6. 9. 'National Landscaping and Gardening Movement' is a translation of 'Dadi yuanlin hua' in Editorial Board of Chinese Agricultural Encyclopaedia, Gardening Volume 中国农业百科全书总编辑委员会观赏园艺卷编辑委员会,中国农业百科全书编辑部, ed. Chinese Agricultural Encyclopaedia, Gardening Volume 中国农业百科全书,观赏园艺卷 (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1996), p. 58. 10. 'Speed up greening construction, advance afforestation quality' 加快绿化速度,提高造林质量. People's Daily (9 March 1959). Author's translation. 11. The phrase 'landscape profession' was used in this research for a better communication in the English context, as the latter equate for the Chinese to what is meant by the former in the West. 12. Mao Tse-tung, 'Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing (February 8, 1942)', in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. 3 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 63. 13. Keishu Saneto 实藤惠秀, A History of Chinese Studying in Japan 中国人留学日本史. trans. Tan Ruqian 谭汝谦, Lin Qiyan 林启彦 (Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore, 1956), p. 334. 14. Department of Landscape of Tokyo University of Agriculture 東京農業大学造園学科, 2nd ed. Landscape Dictionary 造園用語辞典 (Syokoku publication, 2002). 15. It is therefore not correct to consider that the Chinese term, lühua, might be a result of the translation of the corresponding Russian term in the 1950s, as some studies suggested. See: Lin Guangsi 林广思, 'Review and Prospect: A Study of the Landscape Architecture Education in China (1)' 回顾与展望—中国LA学科教育研讨 (1). Chinese Landscape Architecture, 9, 2005, pp. 1–8. 16. Zhang Guoqiang 张国强, 'How old is the word yuanlin?' '园林'一词有多早? Chinese Landscape Architecture, 6, 2007, p. 7. 17. Chen Zhi 陈植, Collected Works on Landscape Architecture of Chen Zhi 陈植造园文集 (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 1988), pp. 175–181. 18. 'Towards National Landscaping and Gardening' 向大地园林化前进. People's Daily (27 March 1959); China Forestry Press. National Landscaping and Gardening (Vol. 1) 大地园林化(第一辑) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1959), p. 1. 19. Wang Shaozeng 王绍增, 'Justification of name: re-discussion of Chinese translation of Landscape Architecture (LA)' 必也正名乎—再论LA的中译名. Chinese Landscape Architecture, 6, 1999, pp. 49–51. 20. Zhao Songqiao, Geography of China: Environment, Resources, Population, and Development (New York; Chichester: Wiley, 1994), p. 74. 21. Jack C. Westoby, '''Making Green the Motherland'': Forestry in China', in China's Road to Development, Neville Maxwell, ed. (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979), p. 236. 22. Sun Zhongshan 孙中山, 'Statement to Li Hongzhang (June, 1894)' 上李鸿章书(—八九四年六月), in The Complete Works of Sun Zhongshan. Vol. 1 (1890-1911) 孙中山 全集 (第一卷, 1890–1911) (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1981), pp. 8–18. 23. Traditionally, over 80% of the total population consisted of farmers, which has remained the case till the modern era. At the time of CCP's 1949 takeover, about 480 million of the total 540 million population were peasants. See Zhao Songqiao, Geography of China: Environment, Resources, Population, and Development (New York; Chichester: Wiley, 1994), p. 69; Tien H. Yuan, China's Population Struggle: Demographic Decisions of the People's Republic, 1949–1969 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1973), p. 43. 24. National Programme for Agricultural Development 1956–1967 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960), p. 18. 25. China Forestry Press 中国林业出版社, Let Us Make Green the Four-Side 我们来绿化四旁 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1958). 26. Interview with Professor Zhu Junzhen, one of the graduates in the early 1950s from China's first landscape architecture programme, 8 October 2005. She also mentioned stamp-like residential parks, which so appeared on plans of residential areas. This also indicated that greening would normally be done after the completion of building constructions. 27. 'Making Green the Motherland' 绿化祖国. People's Daily (17 February 1956). 28. Liu Chieh, 'Our country's forest wealth'. China Reconstructs, IV/8, August 1955, p. 18. 29. The Chinese text is '自己动手,丰衣足食'. Mao Tse-tung, 'Get Organized! (November 29, 1943)', in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. 3 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 154. 30. 'A new ''Great Wall'' of trees'. China Reconstructs, I/3, May-June 1952, pp. 42–44. 31. Publicity Department of the Forestry Ministry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国林业部宣传科, Making Green the Motherland 绿化祖国 (Beijing: Chinese Society of Science and Technology Popularization, 1956), p. 14. 32. For example, Jia Yi (贾谊, 200–168 bc) in his article 'On the Faults of Qin (过秦论)' wrote, 'Sovereign and subject, firmly entrenched in defence, eyed the House of Zhou, with thoughts of rolling up the empire like a mat, enveloping all in the universe, pocketing everything within the four seas, and swallowing all in the eight directions'. (君臣固守以窥周室,有席卷天下,包举宇内,囊括四海之意,并吞八荒之心) Translated in http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/User:Yeu_Ninje/Sandbox. Accessed 24 July 2012. 33. The phrase was referred to in one of Mao's poems in 1963, which read 'The Four Seas are rising, clouds and waters raging. The Five Continents are rocking, wind and thunder roaring'. The Chinese sentences are '四海翻腾云水怒,五洲震荡风雷激'. Translated in Christopher L. Salter, 'In memoriam: selected landscape poetry of Mao Tse-Tung'. The China Geographer, No. 5, Fall, 1976, p. 62. 34. 'Man wins over ''fate'''. China Reconstructs, I/1, January-February 1952, p. 38. 35. Publicity Department of the Forestry Ministry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国林业部宣传科, Making Green the Motherland 绿化祖国 (Beijing: Chinese Society of Science and Technology Popularization, 1956), p. 10. 36. Liu Chieh. 'Our country's forest wealth', China Reconstructs, IV/8, August 1955, pp. 18–21. 37. 'To accomplish ''hundred, thousand, ten thousand'', forestry cadres should try to outdo the others' 实现' 百千万' ,林业干部要争先, in Forestry Ministry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国林业部, The High Tide of Making Green the Motherland (Vol. 1) 绿化祖国的高潮(第一辑) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1958), pp. 9–11. 'mu' is a unit of area in China. One mu is equivalent to 1/15 hectare or 1/6 acre. 38. Liu Qingquan 刘清泉, 'From Four-Side Greening to Whole Land Greening' 由四旁绿化到全境绿化, in China Forestry Press 中国林业出版社, Let Us Make Green the Four-Side 我们来绿化四旁 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1958), pp. 7–16. 39. Mao Tse-tung, 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People (February 27, 1957)', in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 419. 40. The Eight-Character Principle is in Chinese '调整,巩固,充实,提高'. 41. Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (New York: Free Press, 1999), pp. 245–259. 42. Zhao Jijun and Jan Woudstra, 'In Agriculture, Learn from Dazhai' : Mao Zedong's Revolutionary Model Village and the Battle against Nature. Landscape Research, 32/2, April 2007, pp. 171–205. 43. Hua Linmao 华林茂, 'Striving for afforestation, Making Green the Motherland' 植树造林,绿化祖国. People's Daily (8 March 1972). 44. Edwin T. Morris, The Gardens of China: History, Art, and Meanings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983), p. 25. 45. The Forestry Ministry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国林业部, A Collection of Statistics of Chinese Forestry (1949–1987) 全国林业统计资料汇编 (1949–1987) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1990). 46. China Forestry Society 中国林学会, The Development of China's Forestry 中国森林的变迁 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1997), p. 54. 47. Some articles during the Cultural Revolution referred to the vision of a 'sea', such as: 'A picturesque forest "sea" of Gaofeng Mountain' 高峰山林海如画. People's Daily (6 January 1973); 'A forest "sea" in Taihang Mountain' 太行山上一林海. Hebei Daily (2 April 1973). 48. There was no reference to the 'Great Wall' in publications about afforestation during the Cultural Revolution, such as: Hua Linmao 华林茂, 'Striving for afforestation, Making Green the Motherland' 植树造林,绿化祖国. People's Daily (8 March 1972); Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国农林部林业组, Making Green the Motherland (Vol. 5) 绿化祖国(第五集) (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1973); Forestry Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 农林部林业局, Making Green the Motherland (Vol. 7) 绿化祖国(第七集) (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1974); Forestry Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 农林部林业局, Making Green the Motherland (Vol. 9) 绿化祖国(第九集) (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1976). 49. Department of Resources and Forest Management of the Forestry Ministry 林业部资源和林政管理司, Survey of Contemporary Chinese Forest Resources (1949–1993) 当代中国森林资源概况 (1949–1993) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1996), p. 3; Editorial Board of Forest of China 《中国森林》编辑委员会, Forest of China (Vol. 1) 中国森林 (第1卷) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1997), p. 206. 50. Interview with Professor Wang Shaozeng, 12 June 2009. 51. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, A Collection of Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 2. 52. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, A History of Beijing Modern Landscape Architecture 当代北京园林发展史 (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1987), p. 224. 53. The orchards included 571 mu (c. 38 hectares) vineyards, 1280 mu (c. 85 hectares) apple, 529 mu (c. 35 hectares) pear, 185 mu (c. 12 hectares) peach, and 100 mu (c. 7 hectares) apricot. See: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, Annual Report of Beijing Landscape Architecture (1961–1962) 北京市园林绿化工作年报 (1961–1962) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1963), p. 1. 54. Sun Boxun 孙伯勋, 'Management of the vineyards of Dongzhi Road in 1961' 东直路 1961 年葡萄管理情况介绍, in Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, Annual Report of Beijing Landscape Architecture (1961–1962) 北京市园林绿化工作年报 (1961–1962) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1963), pp. 114–115. 55. The Chinese text is '以农业为基础,大办粮食'. See Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, Annual Report of Beijing Landscape Architecture (1960) 北京市园林绿化工作年报 (1960) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1961), p. 4. 56. Editorial Board of Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志编纂委员会, Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1999), p. 31. 57. The 'ten-side land' means the small plots of lands by the side of fields, trenches, roads, channels, graves, houses, walls, woods, barren banks, and ponds. The Chinese text is '地边、渠边、道边、沟边、坟边、房边、墙边、树林边、荒滩边、水坑边'. 58. Editorial Board of Historical Records of the Construction of Beijing 北京建设史书编辑委员会, The Construction of Beijing from the Founding of the People's Republic of China 建国以来的北京城市建设. Restricted publication (1986), p. 353. 59. Editorial Board of Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志编纂委员会, Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1999), p. 31. 60. Quoted from Hangzhou Park Management Bureau 杭州市园林管理局. 'It is good to combine gardens with production, and the West Lake takes on a new look' 园林结合生产好,西湖风景面貌新. Architectural Journal, 1, 1976, p. 44. Author's translation. 61. The name of 'May Seventh Farm' was derived from the 'May Seventh' rural cadre school, which was first established on 7 May 1968 for officials and 'brain workers' to regularly participate in productive labour as a process of 'ideological revolutionization'. 62. 'A brief history of the construction of Zhongshan Park, Shantou' 汕头中山公园建设史略, available at http://stcg.shantou.gov.cn/stgk4-b.htm. Accessed 22 December 2006. 63. Among the misappropriations, an area of 5028 square metres was occupied by the Real Estate Management Bureau of Xuanwu District in 1966 for establishing a residential area; 218 square metres by Beijing Qianxiang Leather Shoes Factory in April 1967; and 900 square metres by Beijing Tannery in April 1970. See Editorial Board of Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志编纂委员会, Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1999), pp. 34–35. 64. Editorial Board of Shanghai Landscape Architecture Records 《上海园林志》编纂委员会, Shanghai Landscape Architecture Records上海园林志 (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2000), p. 377. 65. Lin Xiaoxia 林晓侠, 'Why are factories built in parks?' 工厂为什么办到公园里去了?People's Daily (9 June 1978). 66. It turned out as a result of Western influences from the mid-nineteenth century. For example, in view of the contemporary defeat by Western imperialist powers, Zeng Guofan (1811–1872), one of the initiators of the Westernization Movement (1861–1894), once recorded that 'each committee member examines in detail the machine illustrations, and with the laws of point, line, plane and volume, pursue the functionality of square, circle, the horizontal and the vertical' (各委员详考图说,以点线面体之法,求方圆平直之用), in order to produce vessel and cannon fighting against imperialists. See: Zeng Guofan, The Complete Works of Zeng Guofan 曾文正公全集 (Taibei: Taiwan Eastern Bookstore, 1964). 67. Liu Shanghua 柳尚华, Fifty Years of Chinese Landscape Architecture: 1949–1999 中国风景园林当代五十年:1949–1999 (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 1999), p. 23. 68. Leonid Borisovich Lunts, Greening Construction 绿化建设, trans. Zhu Junzhen 朱钧珍, Liu Chengxian 刘承娴, Ma Shiwei 马士伟, and Shen Dalun 沈大纶 (Beijing: Architectural Engineering Press, 1956), p. 222. These guidelines were consistently followed in the only Chinese handbook on residential greening, published in the late 1950s. See: Research Unit of Regional and City Planning of Architectural Science Research Institute 建筑科学研究院区域规划与城市规划研究室. Neighbourhood Greening 街坊绿化 (Beijing: Architectural Engineering Press, 1959), p. 7. 69. Quoted from Liu Shanghua 柳尚华, Fifty Years of Chinese Landscape Architecture: 1949–1999 中国风景园林当代五十年:1949–1999 (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 1999), pp. 4, 19. Author's translation. 70. Interview with Professor Lü Junhua of Tsinghua University, 17 January 2005. 71. Chen Youmin 陈有民. 'Celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of garden making group (gardening discipline)' 纪念造园组(园林专业)创建五十周年. Chinese Landscape Architecture, 1, 2002, pp, 4–5. Leningrad Forestry Academy is now St Petersburg State Forest-Technical Academy. 72. The Chinese text is '普遍绿化,重点提高'. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局. A Collection of Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 5. 73. The Chinese text is '先绿化,后美化'. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局. A Collection of Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 87. 74. Research Unit of Regional and City Planning of Architectural Science Research Institute 建筑科学研究院区域规划与城市规划研究室, Neighbourhood Greening 街坊绿化 (Beijing: Architectural Engineering Press, 1959), p. 9. 75. Editorial Board of Shanghai Housing Construction Records 《上海住宅建设志》编纂委员会, Shanghai Housing Construction Records 上海住宅建设志 (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1998), p. 280. 76. Other street names included Chinese Flowering Crab-apple Riverside Road (棠浦路), Plum Hill Road (梅岭路), Maple Bridge Road (枫桥路), Flower Brook Road (花溪路), Orchid Brook Road (兰溪路), Plum River Road (梅川路), Jujube Spring Road (枣阳路), and Apricot Hill Road (杏山路). It was common that limited provision of trees resulted in a lack of planting diversity at the time. As a result, this naming approach was so important for the envisioned comprehensiveness that some people in Beijing complained for such scarcity that, 'There was no road with a name associated with trees, such as Bodhi Avenue'. See: Liu Zhonghua 刘仲华, 'Oppose Right deviation, go all out, achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in making green the capital' 反右倾,鼓干劲,多快好省绿化首都, in Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局. A Collection of the Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 1. 77. Editorial Board of Shanghai Housing Construction Records 《上海住宅建设志》编纂委员会, Shanghai Housing Construction Records 上海住宅建设志 (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1998), p. 279. 78. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, A Collection of Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 211. 79. This could be read in the figure of increment of numbers of Chinese public parks in: Li Min 李敏, Modern Parks in China: Development and Evaluation 中国现代公园-发展与评价 (Beijing: Beijing Science and Technology Press, 1987), p. 22. 80. Su Zemin 苏则民, 'Investigations into the experience in Tiananmen Square's reconstruction and planning' 天安门广场改建和规划的经验探讨 (unpublished Master of Architecture Thesis, School of Architecture, Tsinghua University, 1965), p. 1. 81. Imperialism, feudalism and capitalism were claimed as the 'Three Big Mountains', which weighed on the backs of the Chinese people in the 'old society' before the 1949 Liberation. 82. Wu Liangyong 吴良镛, 'The design achievements of the Monument to the People's Heroes' 人民英雄纪念碑的创作成就. Architectural Journal, 2, 1978, p. 4; Dong Guangqi 董光器, 'Some records of Tiananmen Square' 天安门广场纪事, in Fifty Years' Retrospection: Urban Planning of the New China 五十年回眸-新中国的城市规划, Urban Planning Society of China, ed. (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999), p. 514. 83. In the speech delivered by Premier Zhou Enlai in the founding ceremony of the Monument to the People's Heroes on 30 September 1949. See: Wu Liangyong 吴良镛, 'The planning and design of Tiananmen Square' 天安门广场的规划和设计. Collected Essays in Architectural History, 2, 1979, p. 19. 84. Li Jiale 李嘉乐, 'The greening of Tiananmen Square' 天安门广场的绿化, in Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局. A Collection of the Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 21. 85. Wu Liangyong 吴良镛, 'The Planning and Design of the Tiananmen Square' 天安门广场的规划和设计. Collected Essays on Architectural History, 2, 1979, p. 31. 86. Fan Yaobang 范耀邦, 'Suggestions for reasonable density of residential areas' 关于居住区合理密度的几点意见. Architectural Journal, 3, 1980, p. 22. 87. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, 'Greening for Chairman Mao's mausoleum' 毛主席纪念堂的绿化工程. Building Technology, Z1, 1978, p. 113. 88. Quoted from Red Flag of Faculty of South China College of Technology 华南工学院教工红旗 ed. A Collection of Criticisms of the Crimes of Tao Zhu in the Architectural Profession 陶铸在建筑领域的罪行批判集 (Guangzhou: South China College of Technology, 1967), p. 2. Author's translation. 89. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, A History of Beijing Modern Landscape Architecture 当代北京园林发展史 (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1987), p. 44. 90. This was announced in the Member of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress. 91. Liu Shanghua 柳尚华, Fifty Years of Chinese Landscape Architecture: 1949–1999 中国风景园林当代五十年:1949–1999 (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 1999), p. 72. 92. 'Every one should plant three to five trees annually' 每人每年种三至五棵树. People's Daily (16 December 1981). 93. Interview with Professor Wang Shaozeng, 20 November 2010.